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CRIMINAL LAW
THE CONSTITUTION AND TRUTH





In 1902, Clarence Darrow addressed the inmates of the Cook
County Jail in Chicago, Illinois.' In his speech, he did not talk of
rehabilitation or of incapacitation, of morality or of blameworthi-
ness for crimes. Instead, he talked of money. "[I]t will make little
difference if you are guilty or innocent," he told the inmates. "First
and last, it's a question of money."' 2 Only those with money could
hire the lawyers, investigators and experts necessary to present a
defense.3 For those without money, the criminal justice system did
little but pronounce guilt.4 Put simply, money-or lack of it-af-
fected the outcome of criminal trials. 5
Almost a century since Darrow spoke, money continues to influ-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. J.D. 1983, Yale
Law School; LL. M. 1988, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. 1980, Northwestern
University. I am grateful to Rhoda Berkowitz, Lee Pizzimenti, William Richman, Daniel
Steinbock and Benjamin Uchitelle for their many useful comments on an earlier draft.
Bonita Stubblefield and Marcia Minnick supplied invaluable help. The University of To-
ledo supported this project with a University Research Award and Fellowship.
I ARTHUR WEINBERG, ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 3 (1957).
2 Id. at 11.
3 Id. at 12.
4 Id.
5 Concern with the effect of wealth and poverty on the courts is not new. In Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), one of the central cases discussed here, the Court cites
Leviticus 19:15 ("Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the
person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt
thou judge thy neighbor.") and the Magna Carta ("To no one will we sell, to no one will
we refuse, or delay, right or justice."). Id. at 16 and n.10. See also John MacArthur Ma-
quire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1923) (A poor person "may
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ence the outcome of criminal cases. Despite the constitutional re-
quirement that the state supply indigent defendants with counsel,6
other resources critical to a defense 7-the services of investigators,
lose his day in court" because he has no money to pay "costs, fees, expense of legal
services, and sundry miscellaneous expenses incident to litigation.").
6 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (defendants charged with felonies en-
titled to counsel), addressed perhaps the most glaring inequality in the criminal justice
system-those with money could afford counsel; the poor could not. Gideon and
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (defendants charged with misdemeanors who
are incarcerated entitled to counsel), were based on the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel, which exists independent of any issues of equality. Thus, these cases, while
important, are not within the scope of the problem I address here-insufficient access to
services other than counsel necessary to mount a defense.
Note, however, that many question the efficacy of the service provided by some
public defenders and appointed counsel because of lack of resources and heavy
caseloads. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Indigent Defense System KO'd, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 24, 1992,
at 3; Mark Hansen, Criminal Crash Course, 78 A.B.A.J. 14 (Apr. 1992) (all lawyers, practic-
ing and non-practicing, in Knox County, Tenn., forced to take cases of indigent criminal
defendants free because of lack of resources, regardless of lawyers' experience with
criminal defense); Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility,
and Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 473, 483 ("[A]Imost every study made of
defender programs has noted very serious shortcomings that are traceable directly to
lack of funds."); Report, System for Providing Lawyers to Indigent Federal Defendants Needs
Change, Critics Say, 51 GRIM. L. REP. 1263 (June 17, 1992); Rodger Citron, Note,
(Un) Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense Services,
101 YALE L.J. 481 (1991); Peter Applebome, Indigent Defendants, Overworked Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1992, § 4, at 18; Tom Watson, No Dollars for the Defense, LEGAL TIMES,
June 8, 1992, at 1.
7 E.g., Reilly v. Barry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, C.J.) (experts are
such a necessity in trials on issues like insanity or forgery that a "defendant may be at an
unfair advantage if he is unable because of his poverty to parry by his own witnesses the
thrusts of those against him."); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 5-1.4 (3d ed. 1990) (plans for providing defense services "should provide for
investigatory, expert and other services necessary to quality legal representation."); ED-
WARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 609 (3d ed. 1984) ("[S]kills in
building cases with admissible scientific evidence and demolishing these same structures
are becoming increasingly valuable as the forensic applications of science are becoming
more commonplace."); THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 265
(2d ed. 1988) ("Your own experts are usually essential in preparing the cross examina-
tion of your opponent's experts."); ANDRE MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES iii (3d ed. 1986) (scientific evidence and expert testimony increasingly
vital in criminal investigation trials); YOUNG LAWYERS SECTION, BAR ASS'N OF D.C., AND
PUB. DEFENDER SERV. OF D.C., I CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE TRIAL MANUAL 2.1 (1987)
(thorough investigation is key element of defense and "legal, ethical, and moral obliga-
tion" of defense counsel) [hereinafter Criminal Practice Institute]; Edward N. Bliss, Defense
Detective, 47J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCI. 264 (1956) (necessity of defense
investigator); Louis Genevie, The Key to the Desired Verdict, NAT'L L.J.,June 8, 1992, at 15
(importance ofjury selection expert to winning verdicts in Rodney King case); David A.
Harris, It Can Take a Pile of Cash to Fight in Criminal Court, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 17-
18 (emphasizing importance of investigators and experts in criminal litigation and the
fact that indigent defendants seldom have access to these resources); Jim Kitchens, Be
Your Own Sherlock Holmes, TRIAL, Apr. 1992, at 34 (cautioning attorneys who investigate
their own cases that "ethical or tactical considerations will sometimes preclude trial law-
yers from personally investigating certain aspects of their cases, lest they make them-
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scientists and other experts-remain luxuries for indigent
defendants.
In Griffin v. Illinois,8 the Supreme Court first addressed an indi-
gent defendant's request for services other than counsel. Griffin, an
indigent defendant convicted of armed robbery, asked the state to
supply him with a free trial transcript necessary for his appeal. 9 The
Court found the state's refusal to supply the transcript violative of
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 10 Both of these con-
stitutional provisions, the Court said, "emphasize the central aim of
our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so
far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.' " This idea became known as the
equality principle.1 2
As appealing as the equality principle seemed on the surface, it
engendered criticism. The equality principle, Justice Harlan argued
in dissent,' 3 was without any logical limit. It committed the state
not only to avoiding the creation of inequality, but to remedying
inequalities not of its own making. Further, the principle implied a
kind of economic leveling thought to be inconsistent with prevailing
American political and economic philosophy. The only reasonable
governing principle, Harlan said, was due process.14
Almost thirty years after Griffin, the Supreme Court resolved
this debate. In Ake v. Oklahoma,15 the Court held that the Due Pro-
cess Clause alone determined what services, other than counsel, the
state must supply to indigent defendants. 16 Due process entitled
the indigent defendant not to equality, but to the basic tools of an
selves witnesses and thus become disqualified from participating in the trial as lawyers");
see also infra notes 234-88 and accompanying text.
8 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
9 Id. at 13.
10 Id. at 18.
1 Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).
12 The core concept in Griffin is still known as the equality principle. E.g., RONALDJ.
ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 151 (1985); YALE
KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 73 (7th ed. 1989).
13 Justice Harlan's dissents in both Griffin, 351 U.S. 12, 29-39 (1956), and Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 360-67 (1963), set out the criticisms summarized here. See infra
notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
14 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 37. For a thorough treatment of these criticisms, see infra notes
51-59 and accompanying text.
15 470 U.S. 68 (1985). To be sure, there were intermediate steps in Britt v. North
Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971), and Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). See infra notes
65-87 and accompanying text.
16 Ake, 470 U.S. at 76-77.
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adequate defense.' 7 The question was no longer what the indigent
defendant would receive as a matter of equal justice, but what a ba-
sic, minimal standard of justice required.' 8
Ake's "basic tools" doctrine may have avoided the pitfalls of the
equality principle, but as the scholarship that followed Ake 19
showed, Ake raised problems of its own. Ake institutionalized a
double standard of justice: one for those who could pay, and an-
other-the "basic tools" variety-for those who could not.20 Ake
simply failed to come to grips with the problem the Court attempted
to address in Griffn-the effect of disparities in wealth on the out-
comes of criminal cases. If Griffin was too ambitious, surely Ake
failed to do enough. Moreover, as the services of experts, especially
forensic scientists, grow in importance, 21 so too do the implications
of unequal access to these services. If indigent defendants cannot
persuade courts to grant requests for expert services, the outcomes
17 Id. at 77.
18 Id.
19 The scholarship that followed Ake discusses many of these problems. E.g., David
A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach for the Indigent, 68
N.C. L. REV. 763 (1990); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 131-41
(1985) [hereinafter The Supreme Court]; Susan S. Brown, Note, After Ake: Implementing the
Tools of an Adequate Defense, 7 PACE L. REV. 201 (1986); Blake Champlin, Note, Due Process
and Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 21 TULSA L.J. 121 (1985); Karen Frances
Clark, Case Comment, Criminal Procedure-Narrowing the Rights of Future Indigent Criminal
Defendants in the Name of Due Process, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 417 (1986); Mark P. Good-
man, Note, The Right to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert: Might Indigency Preclude Insanity?, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 703 (1986); Brita Haugland, Note, Criminal Procedure: The Constitutional
Extent of the Adequate Tools of a Defense, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 273 (1986); Helen Hubbard,
Note, An Indigent's Constitutional Right to Expert Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 39
Sw. L.J. 957 (1985); Marion Ty Rutter, Note, Ake v. Oklahoma: A Question of Experts, XII
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 385 (1987); Michael James Todd, Case Note, Criminal Procedure-
Due Process and Indigent Defendants: Extending Fundamental Fairness to Include the Right to Ex-
pert Assistance, 29 How. LJ. 610 (1986); John M. West, Note, Expert Services and the
Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MIcH. L.
REV. 1326 (1986); A. Michelle Willis, Comment, Nonpsychiatric Expert Assistance and the
Requisite Showing of Need: A Catch-22 in the Post-Ake Criminal Justice System, 37 EMORY L.J.
995 (1988). Scholarship prior to 1985 shows that interest in the subject of resources
other than counsel for indigent defendants preceded Ake. E.g., Craig Bowman, The Indi-
gent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings,
55 CORNELL L. REV. 632 (1970); John E. Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal
Cases: The Constitutional and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 574 (1982);
Ephraim Margolin & Allen Wagner, The Indigent Criminal Defendant and Defense Services: A
Search For Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 647 (1973); Dennis W. Alexander,
Comment, Assistance in Addition to Counselfor Indigent Defendants: The Need For; The Lack Of,
The Right To, 16 VILL. L. REV. 323 (1970); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for
Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054 (1963).
20 See infra notes 131-32.
21 See supra note 7. I will use the term "expert services" to denote the services of
experts of all kinds, including investigators. I have borrowed the term from West, supra
note 19, at 1327 n.ll.
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of criminal cases will continue to be affected, just as Darrow
thought.
I propose a new approach. Rather than using either the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses, courts should look to the Con-
frontation 22 and Compulsory Process23 Clauses of the Sixth Amend-
ment and to the constitutional right to present a defense. 24 These
three constitutional guarantees have a shared purpose-to help
factfinders decide whether the accused is guilty of the crime
charged. All three are critical to the proper functioning of an adver-
sary system ofjustice, 25 the context within which our courts operate.
Instead of asking what resources would insure the defendant's
equality (as the equality principle would have us do), or asking
whether a particular service is so basic a tool that the state must pay
for it (as Ake says we should do), my theory suggests that we turn our
attention to the central issue in any criminal case: Would the expert
service the defendant wants enhance the jury's ability to find the
facts? After all, the search for truth is the reason the Constitution
protects the right to confrontation, the right to compulsory process
and the right to put on a defense.
Under my theory, which I will refer to as the truth seeking'the-
ory, access to expert services would depend upon the answers to
two questions that are both simpler and easier to answer than those
suggested by the equality principle or Ake's basic tools approach.
First, is the issue to which the resource pertains contested? Second,
if the issue were resolved in favor of the defendant, could it be the
basis for a finding of reasonable doubt? In other words, would the
resource help the factfinder come to a better, more thoroughly in-
formed (even if not always different) decision? The resolution of
defense requests for expert services would rest closer to the pur-
pose of the trial-deciding whether or not the accused is guilty-
than to some undefined idea of equality or "basicness." In contrast
to both the equality principle and the basic tools approach, my the-
ory addresses the problem of wealth-based inequality in the criminal
justice system without employing a standard that sweeps either too
broadly or too narrowly.
With these goals in mind, in Section II of this article, I will dis-
cuss the origins of the equality principle, the Supreme Court's tran-
22 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....").
23 Id. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ....
24 See infra notes 219-30 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 160-78 and accompanying text.
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sition from the equality principle to the basic tools approach, and
the problems arising from each. In Section III, I will fully describe
the truth seeking theory and discuss policy reasons for the theory's
adoption, the theory's place in the adversary system, and its consti-
tutional underpinnings. In Section IV, I will show that the truth
seeking theory responds differently to requests for expert services
than the equality principle or the basic tools approach. I will con-
clude in Section V by discussing several practical considerations in-
volved in imn ementing the theory.
II. FROM GRIFFIN TO AKE: FROM THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE TO
BASIC TOOLS
A. THE EVOLUTION OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court considered state provision of services
other than counsel for the first time in Griffin v. Illinois.26 After con-
viction, the defendants27 in Griffin asked the state to provide them
with a free transcript since they were indigent.28 Without the tran-
script, they could not provide the appellate court with the required
bill of exceptions or report of proceedings at trial,29 regardless of
the merits of their claim; in contrast, any defendant with money to
buy a transcript would not face this obstacle. 30 Illinois refused to
provide the transcripts, and the state's courts upheld this refusal. 31
Justice Black's opinion found that the denial of the transcript
violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.3 2 Both
of these constitutional provisions, Justice Black said, highlighted the
central tenet of the American judicial system: equal justice before
the law for everyone, rich or poor.33 Black invoked the language of
discrimination to describe the situation: A state that provided for
appellate review could not "do so in a way that discriminates against
some convicted defendants on account of their poverty." 34 Poverty-
based discrimination in criminal trials, Black said, is just as odious as
26 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
27 Griffin and co-defendant Crenshaw were tried together. Id. at 13.
28 Id. The full request was for a certified record of the trial, which would include a
transcript.
29 Id. at 13-14.
30 Id. at 16.
31 Id. at 15.
32 Id. at 19. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Clark joined Justice
Black's opinion. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the judgment and wrote a separate
opinion.
33 Id. at 17.
34 Id. at 18.
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discrimination based on race, religion or color.3 5 Put simply,
"[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has." 36
Black's analysis in Griffin lacked precision. For instance, he
hardly seemed to distinguish between the equal protection and due
process justifications for the Court's holding. Yet, Griffin clearly
held the state responsible for remedying an inequality not of its own
making. This obligation went a step beyond simply prohibiting the
state from creating illegitimate discrimination through its own
actions.
With intermediate steps in 195937 and 1961,38 Justice Black's
position reached maturity in Douglas v. California.3 9 After conviction,
the indigent defendants in Douglas sought appointment of counsel to
assist in presentation of appeals of right.40 In accordance with a
state rule of criminal procedure, the District Court of Appeal re-
viewed the record and concluded that appointment of counsel
would do "no good whatever. ' 41 Thus, while a person with money
could present an appeal of right, complete with briefs and oral argu-
ment by counsel regardless of the merits, an indigent appellant's
case was prejudged.42 The Supreme Court found that this practice
violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, calling
it "'a discrimination at least as invidious as that condemned in Grif-
fin . . . .' "4 In each case, "the evil is the same: discrimination
against the indigent. ' ' 44 The Court did not require absolute equal-
ity,45 but it would not countenance the line the California statute
had drawn between the cases of the rich, who could require the
court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding, and those of
35 Id. at 17.
36 Id. at 19.
37 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959) (refusal to allow indigent defendant to
proceed without paying costs violates Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
38 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 710-14 (1961) (refusal to docket habeas corpus
petition because of failure by indigent prisoner to pay filing fee violates Equal Protection
Clause).
39 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
40 Id. at 354.
41 Id. at 355.
42 Id. at 356.
43 Id. at 355 (quoting People v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1072, 1076 (Cal. 1960) (TraynorJ.,
concurring)).
44 Id. The Supreme Court reserved the question of the effect of such a statute in
discretionary appeals or on appeals that are at a stage "at which the claims have once
been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court." See infra notes 57-
66 and accompanying text.
45 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
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the poor, who got no real hearing.46 This amounted to both a de-
nial of due process and an invidious discrimination. 47 Thus, the
equality principle was fully formed: One could not be treated differ-
ently in the criminal justice system simply because of poverty.
While the boundaries of this rule were indistinct, it implied not only
that the state must not create discrimination, but also that the state
was responsible for remedying the effects of existing discrimination
not of its own making.
The equality principle generated substantial support by courts
and commentators. Drawing on the broad implications of Griffin and
Douglas, many observers believed that if the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses prohibited economic discrimination within the
criminal justice system,48 perhaps these constitutional provisions
46 Id.
47 Id. at 355-56.
48 The equality principle of Grffin and Douglas was applied and discussed in other
cases and in numerous articles. E.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1970)
(statute allowing enlargement of maximum imprisonment if defendant is unable to pay
fine violates Equal Protection Clause; Court reaffirms Griffin's "allegiance to the basic
command that justice be equally applied to all persons"); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S.
40, 42 (1967) ("[D]ifferences in access to the instruments needed to vindicate legal
rights, when based upon the financial situation of the defendant, are repugnant to the
Constitution" and violate Equal Protection Clause); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (abolishing poll tax, declaring that "[lines drawn on the basis
of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored"); Draper v. Wash-
ington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708, 710-14 (1961) (refusal to docket habeas corpus petition because of failure by
indigent to pay filing fee held violative of Equal Protection Clause); Burns v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959) (refusal to allow informa pauperis petition to proceed before
Ohio Supreme Court violates Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses); United States
v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting) (Griffin doctrine
"represents an important step forward in the direction of democratic justice"); Francis
Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 157 (1957)
(discussing whether Griffin requires providing indigent defendants with expert witnesses
and investigators); Philip Fahringer, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and
Its Progeny, 16 STAN. L. REV. 394, 409-15 (1964) (arguing that Griffin requires rethinking
of traditional practices regarding bail, alternative sentencing and aid for investigators
and expert witnesses); Frederick G. Hamley, The Impact of Griffin v. Illinois on State Court-
Federal Court Relationships, 24 F.R.D. 75, 78 (1960) (discussing impact of Griffin on prac-
tice of using monetary bail, requirements of filing fees and appellate bonds, and state
appointment of counsel); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 947 (1975) (Warren
Court's "most significant imprint" may lie in the expansion of the Equal Protection
Clause to protect, inter alia, indigent criminal suspects, citing both Griffin and Douglas);
Bertram F. Willcox & Edward J. Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1957) ("[T]he Griffin decision brings new vigor to our
democracy. It promises to stand... as a milestone in the treatment of the poor and and
friendless by the courts of our land."); see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398-99 (1971)
(system in which punishment by fines results in imprisonment only for indigent persons
due to their inability to pay violates Equal Protection Clause); Mayer v. Chicago, 404
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might also require the state to alleviate economic inequalities in ar-
eas such as housing, subsistence and education.49 Indeed, Griffin
and Douglas seemed to open up new vistas to equal protection
analysis. 50
Notwithstanding their rhetorical appeal, Justice Black's opin-
ions in Griffin and Douglas provoked criticism from Justice Harlan,
whose dissents questioned the very premises of the equality princi-
ple. Harlan's objections revolved around two related ideas. First,
Harlan objected to the imposition of "an affirmative duty to lift the
handicaps flowing from.., economic circumstances" based on the
Equal Protection Clause.5 1 Harlan found the situations of the de-
fendants in Griffin and Douglas to be no different than other cases in
which the "economic burden attendant upon the exercise of a privi-
lege bears equally upon all"; yet, in these other cases, the Court did
not consider the resulting classification invidious.5 2 What was at
work, Harlan said, was not the typical equal protection analysis of
classification schemes, but rather the Court's "unarticulated conclu-
sion" that the procedure violated "fundamental fairness. '53 Cases
such as Griffin and Douglas were therefore more appropriately ana-
lyzed under the Due Process Clause.5 4
Second, Harlan questioned the potentially broad implications
U.S. 189, 195-96 (1971) (unconstitutional to supply free transcripts to appellants in fel-
ony, but not misdemeanor, cases punishable only by fines).
49 E.g., Gary S. Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and
the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REV. 223, 223 (1970) ("En-
couraged by the progressive line of equal protection decisions beginning in the criminal
law area [citing Griffin and Douglas] and reaching into state welfare policies, commenta-
tors and attorneys for the poor began to apply the new equal protection to the legal
analysis of other problems, particularly to inequality in education and the unequal provi-
sion of state and municipal services."); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7,
9, 11 n. 12 (1969) (suggesting cases such as Griffin and Douglas imply an equal protection-
based "duty to protect against certain hazards which are endemic in an unequal society,"
even though the society on the whole "continues to be individualistic, competitive and
market-oriented .... ").
50 E.g., Note, Discriminations Against The Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment," 81 HARV. L.
REV. 435,446 (1967) ("The principles developed in Griffin, Douglas and Harper [v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)] have implications far beyond their narrow fact situa-
tions. The most obvious applications are within the criminal law area, but the principles
might also be extended to civil litigation, education, medical care, or any area in which
there is important state involvement.").
51 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956).
52 Id. at 35.
53 Id. at 35-36.
54 Id. at 36; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 363 (1963). Addressing the issue of
fundamental fairness, Harlan found no violation of due process in either case. Neither
the Illinois nor California systems at issue in Griffin and Douglas were a denial of funda-
mental fairness that shocked the conscience. 351 U.S. at 38; 372 U.S. at 363-67.
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of the equal protection reasoning used in Griffin and Douglas. Ac-
cording to Harlan, the implications of the equality principle 55 sim-
ply did not comport with our Constitution or system of
government: 5
6
[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States "an af-
firmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in eco-
nomic circumstances." To so construe it would be to read into the
Constitution a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign to many of
our basic concepts of the proper relations between government and
society. The State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils
of poverty, but it is not required by the Equal Protection Clause to give
to some whatever others can afford. 57
Harlan found the logic of Griffin and Douglas too broad even if
confined to the criminal justice system. If the deprivation of tran-
scripts or counsel for appeal violated the Equal Protection Clause,
what were the limits of this reasoning? Did the equality principle
require that indigent defendants be given access to the same re-
sources that the wealthiest defendant had? Conversely, would the
equality principle prevent wealthy defendants from spending more
money on their defenses than the amount provided by the state to
indigent defendants? Did the principle dictate that the resources
available to both rich and poor defendants must be brought to some
undefined middle level? While the Court held that the Constitution
did not require absolute equality of access to defense services, 58 it
supplied no principle by which to distinguish the practices that vio-
lated the Constitution from those that did not.59
55 See supra note 49.
56 In fact, several commentators disagree with Harlan's contention that application
of the equality principle within the narrow context of criminal justice exceeded constitu-
tional and economic norms. See, e.g., Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 48, at 15-16 (Griffin
majority's goal of equal access to justice is essential to guarantee democratic govern-
ment); Fahringer, supra note 48, at 415 (contrary to Harlan's view, "the equal protection
clause does offer a rational standard for reaching results that does comport with our
ideals.").
More recently, commentators have argued that equal protection standards should
inform analysis of the quality of counsel which the state must provide to indigent crimi-
nal defendants. See Gary S. Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assist-
ance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 65 (1986) (equal
protection principles dictate that similarly situated defendants should not receive une-
qual treatment, either because of unequally skilled attorneys or because they do not
have equivalent resources to devote to the case; the latter can make competent lawyers
"functionally incompetent because they lack the time and resources necessary to do
competent work.").
57 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 362 (citation omitted).
58 Id. at 357.
59 Even supporters of the majority opinion concede this point to Harlan. E.g., Will-
cox & Bloustein, supra note 48, at 13 (key to Griffin is not logical reasoning; rather, it is a
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There is much force in Harlan's criticisms. While the equality
principle surely represents an earnest and well-intentioned effort to
deal with the effect of poverty on criminal defendants, it is, if noth-
ing else, simply too open-ended. Nevertheless, from 1956 to 1971,
the Supreme Court extended the Griffin majority's logic to new con-
texts, both civil and criminal. 60 In Mayer v. City of Chicago,61 the
Court extended Griffin to mandate the provision of trial transcripts
to cases in which the defendant could only be punished by a fine.62
The majority in Mayer held that the equality principle should not
attempt to strike a balance between the interest of the state and the
defendant. 63 "[The] principle is a flat prohibition against pricing
indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be avail-
able to others able to pay their own way.... The State's fiscal inter-
est is, therefore, irrelevant." 64  Perhaps in reaction to this far-
reaching statement, the Court began to move away from the equal-
ity principle and toward due process analysis in Britt v. North Caro-
lina65 and Ross v. Moffitt. 66
In Britt, an indigent defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial
because of a deadlocked jury.67 In preparation for the second trial,
the defendant moved unsuccessfully for a free transcript of the first
feeling "that it was an indecency, in a nation of free people, to bar a poverty stricken
man from a chance to show that his government had convicted the innocent.").
In the 1980s, the struggle over the meaning of equality took on new vibrancy. See
Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539-40, 543-50 (1982), in
which Professor Westen makes an argument similar in some ways to Justice Harlan's: To
say two people are equal and must therefore be treated equally is to substitute hidden
value judgments for analysis. See PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF 'EQUALITY' IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990). For a
reply to Professor Westen, see, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas ': Logical
Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE LJ. 1136, 1136-41, 1144-47 (1982) (de-
crying Westen's preference for rules over the idea of equality as conceptual tool).
60 E.g., Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Equal Protection Clause
violated by required payment of fee or tax to vote); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970) (Equal Protection Clause mandates uniform limits on imprisonment, regardless
of indigent convict's inability to pay court-imposed fines); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395
(1971) (Equal Protection Clause prohibits incarceration of indigent defendants con-
victed of offenses punishable only by fines).
61 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
62 Id. at 196-98.
63 Id. at 196.
64 Id. at 196-97. This language seems especially strong in light of what follows in
Britt and Ross, see infra notes 67-87 and accompanying text, and the clear command of Ake
that courts should engage in a due process balancing that includes the state's interest in
its fisc, see infra note 92. See KAMISAR Er AL., supra note 12, at 75 ("[Mayer] carried the
Griffin principle further than it ever has the Gideon principle ... .
65 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
66 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
67 Britt, 404 U.S. at 226.
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trial. 68 The Supreme Court refused to hold that the state must pro-
vide a free transcript in such a case.69
More importantly, however, Britt foreshadows the end of the
equality principle, even while seeming to reaffirm it. While assert-
ing that the Equal Protection Clause still governed the treatment of
indigent defendants, 70 the Court conceded one of the main argu-
ments against the equality principle: it seemed to have no clear
"outer limits." 7' The Court then took a clear (if somewhat tenta-
tive) step away from equal protection and toward due process. Grif-
fin and the equality principle did not mandate equality of resources
treatment; rather, they guaranteed "the basic tools of an adequate
defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other
prisoners." 72
The evolution toward due process continued in Ross v. Moffitt, 73
in which the Court expressly limited the equality principle. 74 The
issue in Ross was whether the Constitution required appointment of
counsel for discretionary appellate review. 75 The Supreme Court
began by acknowledging the analytical and doctrinal confusion ap-
parent in Griffin and Douglas. Neither due process nor equal protec-
tion provided a fully satisfactory or coherent basis for cases decided
under the equality principle. 76 Due process emphasized fairness be-
tween the individual and the state; equal protection focused on dis-
68 Id. at 226-27. Note that Britt is the first of the cases discussed here in which the
assistance sought by the indigent defendant is to be used for trial, instead of appeal. Yet
the equality principle was, from the beginning, considered a way to assist the indigent
defendant at trial. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) ("There can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has."). Since that assumption has now carried through to Ake, I make it here as well.
69 Britt, 404 U.S. at 229. Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court said that, given the
small-town setting of the case, the court reporter could have shared his trial notes with
counsel to help prepare for the second trial. Britt thus seems confined to a setting
largely irrelevant to urban court systems. Further, I wonder about the efficacy of this
arrangement if the necessity arose for impeachment of a witness during the second trial.
At the very least, it would make impeachment significantly more cumbersome; instead of
reading from a printed page, there would have to be constant references to, and reading
from, stenographic notes intelligible only to the court reporter. This would likely take at
least some of the force out of what can be a powerfully dramatic tool. See, e.g., MAUET,
supra note 7, at 234, 242-53.
70 Britt, 404 U.S. at 227.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
74 Id. at 610.
75 Specifically, the indigent defendant in Ross moved for appointment of counsel to
assist in obtaining discretionary review by the North Carolina Supreme Court and to
assist in the preparation of a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 603-05 (1974).
76 Id. at 608-09.
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parity in treatment by a state between arguably similar individuals.
77
As for due process, the Court found Ross easily distinguishable
from cases in which a resource is necessary for trial.78 In a trial, the
accused is presumed innocent and seeks to use the Due Process
Clause and other constitutional provisions as a shield for protection
from the government. 79 In an appeal, by contrast, the defendant
seeks to overturn an existing finding of guilt.80 Given these "signifi-
cant differences between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal
proceeding,"8' denying indigent defendants appointed counsel for
discretionary appeals did not offend the Due Process Clause.
As for equal protection, the Court de-emphasized equality and
the effect of poverty on criminal trials.8 2 According to the Court,
there were limits beyond which equal protection analysis could not
go without distorting recognized principles. 83 The Fourteenth
Amendment" 'does not require absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages,' nor does it require the State to 'equalize economic con-
ditions.'"84 These words resemble Justice Harlan's criticism of the
equality principle;85 they reflect a conception of equal protection in
the criminal justice system, clothed in the language of equality but
actually rooted in due process. Under the Equal Protection Clause,
the Court said, the state's duty is not to duplicate for the poor the
legal arsenal of the rich, but simply to assure that "indigents have an
adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adver-
sary system." 86 Thus, after Ross, the equality principle becomes
nothing more than a thinly disguised form of due process analysis.
87
Ross thus set the stage for the full ascendancy of the Harlan position
that came eleven years later in Ake v. Oklahoma.88
77 Id. at 609.
78 Id. at 610-11.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 610.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 611-12.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 612 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 24
(1973) (Equal Protection Clause does not require states to fund all public school dis-
tricts equally), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
85 See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
86 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
87 Yale Kamisar, Poverty, Equality, and Criminal Procedure, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DESKBOOK 1-101 (National College of District Attorneys, ed., 3d ed. 1978). Indeed,
after Ross it is not even clear that the equality principle "add[s] anything to what the indi-
gent defendant already has in his arsenal" by virtue of the Due Process Clause. KAMISAR
ET AL., supra note 12, at 83.
88 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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Ake represents the final and complete collapse of the equality
principle into due process analysis. In Ake, the indigent accused's
only defense to homicide and other charges was insanity.8 9 The trial
judge denied the defendant's motion for appointment of a psychia-
trist to assist with the insanity defense.90 Thejury found Ake guilty,
and he received two death sentences. 9' The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the trial court should have supplied the defend-
ant with a psychiatrist at state expense.
92
The Court began by recognizing the importance of defense ex-
perts in the criminal justice system. Experts, like psychiatrists, can
play critical roles in the defense of criminal cases. 93 For example, a
psychiatrist would not only examine the defendant to ascertain his
sanity at the time of the offense; the psychiatrist would also assist the
defense by evaluating the strength of the insanity defense, present-
ing the defense to the jury, 94 and by helping to evaluate and cross-
examine government experts. 95
Perhaps more importantly, in Ake the equality principle dis-
solves into due process. The Court characterized Griffin, Douglas and
other cases based on the equality principle as built around the
theme of "[m]eaningful access to justice." 96 A state, the Court held,
"must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity
to present his defense," 97 because "justice cannot be equal where,
simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportu-
nity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his
liberty is at stake."98 The Court described the concerns raised by
poverty in the criminal justice system as questions of fundamental
fairness, 99 the traditional language of due process.
As for the effect of poverty on criminal trials, Ake implied that,
beyond setting a constitutional minimum, there was no satisfactory
approach but to allow free market economics to dictate the distribu-
89 Id. at 72.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 73. Thejury also sentenced Ake to 500 years of imprisonment on two counts
of shooting with intent to kill. Id.
92 Id. at 74.
93 Id. at 81.
94 Id. at 81-83.
95 Id.; see also MAUET, supra note 7, at 265 (emphasizing importance of using expert to
understand and confront opponent's experts); MARILYN J. BERGER ET AL., TRIAL ADVO-
CACY, PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY 405 (1989).
96 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1985).
97 Id. at 76.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 77.
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tion of legal services.100 All due process required was that indigent
defendants get " 'an adequate opportunity to present their claims
fairly within the adversary system.' "101 Implementing this principle
meant identifying the "'basic tools of an adequate defense or ap-
peal' . ... '102
To determine whether something is a "basic tool," the Court
resorted to the familiar three-factor due process balancing test of
Mathews v. Eldridge. 03 Under the Mathews test, a court balances
three factors:
The first is the private interest that will be affected by the action of the
State. The second is the governmental interest that will be affected if
the safeguard is to be provided. The third is the probable value of the
addition or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safe-
guards are not provided.104
Applying the Mathews test, the Court said the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation of liberty was so high without a psychiatrist to assist
with an insanity defense, 10 5 and the state's fiscal interest was so
low, 106 that the trial court should have granted the motion. There-
fore, the Court held that when a defendant shows that sanity will be
a "significant factor" at trial, "the State must, at a minimum, assure
the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct
an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation,
and presentation of the defense."' 107 The Court left the terms "sig-
nificant factor" and "basic tool" for lower courts to define.' 08 In a
case such as Ake-in which sanity was the only issue' 0 9-the Court
held that a psychiatrist was a basic tool of an adequate defense.
B. DEFICIENCIES OF THE AKE STANDARD
Even if Ake does address the doctrinal problems raised by the
equality principle, the case raises problems of its own. These
100 Id.; see also The Supreme Court, supra note 19, at 139-40 (Ake exemplifies the Supreme
Court's submergence of wealth-oriented equal protection analysis into due process doc-
trine, avoiding the wealth question).
101 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (citation omitted).
102 Id. (citation omitted).
103 Id. at 77 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 79-82.
106 Id. at 78. The state's interest in preserving its treasury was small. The state had
no interest in any strategic advantage that the lack of a psychiatrist for the defense would
give it, since the state's interest in criminal trials is not just to win but to obtain an
accurate verdict.
107 Id. at 83.
108 Id.
109 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
483
DAVID A. HARRIS
problems stem from ambiguities in the opinion, misinterpretation of
Ake by lower courts, and disregard of the implications of economic
disparity in criminal justice.
1. The Meaning of "Basic Tools"
To say that the state must supply the indigent defendant with
the basic tools of an adequate defense only begins the inquiry.'
10
How basic does a tool have to be before the Due Process Clause
obligates the state to supply it to indigent defendants?
The Mathews due process approach, which the Court used in Ake
to determine what a basic tool is, offers no answers. The Mathews
balancing test is inherently ambiguous; this makes it highly manipu-
lable.' Since Mathews fails to articulate its underlying values and
assumptions, ' 12 the test becomes whatever a court wants it to be in
any particular case.'1
Many lower court interpretations of Ake attempt to limit its
reach by looking at its facts narrowly. For example, Ake dealt with
only one type of expert-a psychiatrist. Nothing in the opinion,
however, limited its reasoning to psychiatrists. Presumably, any
type of expert who meets the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test
should fall within Ake's ambit. Some courts, however, have inter-
preted the Supreme Court's failure to move explicitly beyond psy-
chiatry' '4 as an invitation to declare that Ake does not cover other
types of experts." 15 Other courts disagree." ,
6
110 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
111 West, supra note 19, at 1335-36 (1986). For these and other reasons, Justice Ste-
vens has argued that the Mathews balancing test is appropriate only for property inter-
ests, not for liberty interests. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 59-60
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 275-81 (1984)
(pretrial detention for juveniles approved; procedural safeguards adequate under
Mathews).
112 See, e.g., Champlin, supra, note 19, at 127 n.47 (values and assumptions underlying
due process balancing test left unarticulated).
113 Others argue that the Mathews approach is desirable precisely because of its flexi-
bility. See Goodman, supra note 19, at 729 n.177.
114 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323-24 n.1 (1985) (refusal to provide several
experts, including one on ballistics, upheld because requests were merely "undeveloped
assertions"; question of entitlement to nonpsychiatric experts expressly reserved).
115 E.g., Harris v. Vasquez, second amended opinion, 943 F.2d 930, 949-50 (9th Cir.
1990); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885-87 (9th Cir. 1990) (appointment of expert on
eyewitness identification would require an extension of Ake); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy,
919 F.2d 1091, 1119 (6th Cir. 1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Ake limited to psychia-
trist, which is provided only "after defendant shows his sanity will be a significant fac-
tor"); Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606, 619 (9th Cir. 1990); Cartwright v. Maynard, 802
F.2d 1203, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 1986); Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir.
1986); Bowden v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 761, 763 (11th Cir. 1985); Kansas v. Call, 760 F.
Supp. 190, 192 (D. Kan. 1991) (Ake does not apply to expert DEA agents who could
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Courts construing Ake have also focused on the extent to which
denial of the defendant's request for expert service determined the
outcome of his case. For example, in Ake, insanity was the only is-
sue; proof of insanity is heavily dependent on expert testimony.
The Court in Ake recognized that when a state makes the defend-
ant's mental condition relevant to culpability and punishment, "the
assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's
ability to marshal his defense."' 17 Add to this the fact that psychia-
try is not an exact science,"18 and it quickly becomes apparent that
testify about marijuana supplies); Siebert v. State, 562 So. 2d 586, 590 (Ala. Grim. App.
1989) (quoting Ex Parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 82 (Ala. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865
(1985) (Ake does not extend beyond psychiatrists)); Ex Parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (Ake limited to psychiatrists and the insanity defense); Ex
Parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 82 (Ala. 1985) (On Application for Reh'g) (Ake limited to
psychiatrists and issue of insanity only); Hough v. State, 560 N.E.2d 511, 516 (Ind.
1990) (Ake does not extend to social psychologist who would assist injury selection or
psychologist who would help present non-sanity defense); State v. Zuniga, 357 S.E.2d
898, 908 (N.C. 1987) (investigators do not fall under Ake because, inter alia, counsel
should interview witnesses); State v. Massey, 342 S.E.2d 811, 816 (N.C. 1986) (defend-
ant not entitled to expert on competency to waive Miranda rights); Williamson v. State,
812 P.2d 384, 395 (Okla. Grim. App. 1991) (Ake does not extend beyond psychiatrists);
Shelton v. State, 793 P.2d 866, 873-74 (Okla. Grim. App. 1990) (defendant not entitled
to investigator); Munson v. State, 758 P.2d 324, 330 (Okla. Grim. App. 1988) (Ake does
not extend beyond psychiatrists); Vowell v. State, 728 P.2d 854 (Okla. Grim. App. 1986)
(same); Stafford v. Love, 726 P.2d 894, 896 (Okla. 1986) (Ake limited to psychiatric ex-
perts); Moore v. State, 802 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Texas Ct. App. 1990) (Ake does not
extend to expert on victim's injuries, since it is limited to psychiatrists in insanity cases);
see also West, supra note 19, at 1341-42 & n.1 11 (requests for non-psychiatric experts
rejected on basis of insufficient showing of need).
116 E.g., Kordenbrock, 919 F.2d at 1103-05 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (Ake not limited to
insanity cases; also applies in cases in which defendant's "mental capacity" is at issue);
Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243, (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1210 (1988) (rule of Ake applies to requests for experts other than psychiatrists;
question isn't expert's field but importance of issue to which expert would speak);
Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 711-12 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1054 (1987) (court "assume[d], for sake of argument that the due process clause could
require the government, both state and federal, to provide non-psychiatric expert assist-
ance to an indigent defendant.. ."); State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1987)
(defendant entitled to expert on intoxication defense); In re Allen R., 506 A.2d 329, 331
(N.H. 1986) (Ake entitles defendant to mental health expert on issue of defendant's com-
petency to waive Miranda rights); Washington v. State, 800 P.2d 252, 253 (Okla. Grim.
App. 1990) (Supreme Court did not preclude extending principles of Ake to experts
other than psychiatrists such as forensic odontologists); but see Stanridge v. State, 701
P.2d 761 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (question of whetherAke extends to other experts left
open). States have been required to pay for important scientific tests in noncriminal
cases as well. See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (requiring state to pay for
blood grouping tests requested by indigent putative father in paternity case).
117 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985). But cf. Kordenbrock, 919 F.2d at 1119
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Ake does not entitle defendant to psychiatric assistance on
issue of diminished capacity through drug use, notwithstanding that testimony would
bear directly on issue of specific intent necessary to convict).
118 Ake, 470 U.S. at 81.
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having a psychiatrist was " 'a virtual necessity if [Ake's] insanity plea
[was] to have any chance of success.' "119 In other words, the pres-
ence of a psychiatrist in Ake was an all-or-nothing proposition: With
a psychiatrist, the defense could present an insanity defense to the
jury; without a psychiatrist, no jury would sustain an insanity
defense.
As lower courts have struggled to define "basic tools," they
have asked whether the particular resource requested by an indigent
defendant is a " 'virtual necessity' "120 for the defense. Is the re-
source so important that the defense simply cannot do without it?
Thus, "basic tool" has come to mean not just something fundamen-
tal to a defendant's legal arsenal, but a resource without which the
defense fails.' 21 Under this interpretation, most expert services re-
119 Id. (footnote omitted).
120 Id.
121 Many cases limit expert services to such "virtual necessity" situations. E.g., United
States v. Austin, 933 F.2d 833, 841 (10th Cir. 1991) (with psychiatric aid, either insanity
or absence of criminal intent may have been available as defenses); Jackson v. Ylst, 921
F.2d 882, 885-87 (9th Cir. 1990) (Ake does not extend to appointment of expert on
eyewitness identification, where that issue is only one of several issues in contention);
Kansas v. Call, 760 F. Supp. 190, 192 (D. Kan. 1991) (Ake does not extend to DEA
agents who could have offered testimony concerning marijuana supplies); Clark v. State,
562 N.E.2d 11, 14-15 (Ind. 1990) (funds to hire expert witnesses on arson and medical
issues, including inconsistency of defendant's injuries with prosecution's case, properly
denied); Hough v. State, 560 N.E.2d 511, 515-17 (Ind. 1990) (requests for psychologists
and ballistics expert denied as not mandated by Ake and because defendant offered no
evidence to think such experts would differ with state experts); State v. Zuniga, 357 S.E.
2d 898, 908 (N.C. 1987) (unless defendant shows reasonable likelihood of fundamen-
tally unfair trial, request for investigator properly denied); State v. Massey, 342 S.E.2d
811, 816 (N.C. 1986) (Ake requires hiring a state-funded psychiatrist only when sanity is
a significant factor in the case; it does not require hiring psychiatrist to assist in deter-
mining whether defendant's mental capacity was such that he could have voluntarily and
intelligently waived Miranda rights); Tibbs v. State, 819 P.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1991) (requests for medical doctor, fingerprint expert and criminal investigator
denied in case where defense was that another person committed the crime because,
inter alia, defendant failed to demonstrate "specific need" under Ake); Williamson v.
State, 812 P.2d 384, 395-96 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (refusal to grant motion for state-
funded hair and serology expert did not violate due process, because, inter alia, evidence
in scientific subjects can be addressed through cross-examination); Banks v. State, 810
P.2d 1286, 1293 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (cross-examination of state's expert ade-
quately substitutes for defense expert who could have discredited "extremely damaging
fingerprint evidence"); Shelton v. State, 793 P.2d 866, 873-74 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990)
(appointment of investigator refused, because defendant did not demonstrate that "he
was denied access to evidence which is material to either guilt or punishment ... [and]
substantial prejudice"); Munson v. State, 758 P.2d 324, 330 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988)
(denial of funds for serologist, hair analyst, chemist and investigator reversed only if
defendant shows substantial prejudice from clear and convincing evidence); see also STE-
PHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 651 (4th ed.
1992) (courts do not appoint experts for defense unless absolutely essential) (citing Har-
ris, supra note 19); but see United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985) (Ake
covers experts on mental condition as well as sanity); State v. Poulson, 726 P.2d 1036,
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main luxuries for indigent defendants because the tasks experts per-
form and the issues with which they deal are not usually outcome
determinative by themselves. 122 Rather, the service any one expert
or investigator provides is typically germane only to one or a few
elements of the crime. 123 If any one of the links in the evidentiary
chain weakens, an acquittal may result, but this usually does not de-
pend on the testimony of a single expert, such as the psychiatrist in
Alke. Since lower courts have interpreted Ake to mean that the de-
fense receives assistance only when the accused's case will fail with-
out it, the basic tools standard does very little for most indigent
defendants.
2. Unreasonably High Standards
Lower courts must give meaning to the ambiguous terms in
Ake-o"basic tools" and "significant factor." In particular, interpret-
ing courts must decide what amount and type of evidence indigent
defendants must advance to prove they deserve expert services. In
decisions on this issue, many courts have denied the accused expert
or investigative assistance, not because the service sought is not im-
portant enough, but because the quantum of proof required by the
court is too great or the defendant cannot present the evidence as
early in the litigation as the court wants it.124 For example, under
1038 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (Ake speaks in terms of sanity but does not preclude the
applicability of its rationale to the broader scope of a defendant's mental condition, so
Ake also covers experts on diminished capacity); Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1018
( 11th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 918 F.2d 888 (I1th Gir. 1990) (systematic denial
of, inter alia, investigative and expert resources to indigent defendants states cognizable
federal claim); Other courts agree on limiting provision of expert services to situations
where the presence is outcome determinative, yet still misapply the standard. Cf. Moore
v. State, 802 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (request for expert on victim's
injuries denied, even though extent of injuries critical to judgment on guilt for aggra-
vated robbery).
122 See infra notes 232-79 and accompanying text.
123 Id.
124 E.g., Guinan v. Armontrout, 909 F.2d 1224, 1227-28 (8th Cir. 1990) (history of
violent crime, brutality of current crime and counsel's belief that defendant is mentally
ill do not rise to level of "significant factor" in accused's defense); Stewart v. State, 562
So. 2d 1365, 1368-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (to obtain psychiatrist under Ake, defend-
ant must make preliminary showing "that his sanity at the time of the offense is ques-
tionable.... A defendant bears the burden of pursuading the court that a doubt exists as
to his or her competency"); Hopkins v. State, 582 N.E.2d 345, 353 (Ind. 1991) (denial of
requests for expert assistance reversed only if "so prejudicial as to amount to an abuse
of discretion"); State v. Dunn, 758 P.2d 718 (Kan. 1988) (defendant must show mental
capacity is a significant issue before Mathews balancing is attempted); State v. Broom, 533
N.E.2d 682, 691 (Ohio 1988) ("defendant must show a reasonable probability that ex-
pert would aid his defense, and that denial of expert's assistance would result in unfair
trial.") (quoting Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987)); Banks v.
State, 810 P.2d 1286, 1293 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (defendant denied expert must
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Moore v. Kemp,12 5 the defendant must "demonstrate a substantial ba-
sis" for any affirmative defense, and explain to the court both the
state and defense cases and how the requested expert would fit into
both. 126 Moreover, the accused must do this at the earliest stages of
the case, perhaps before discovery and other fact gathering has
taken place,1 27 effectively eliminating the chance for the defense to
explore tenable issues.
3. Failure to Recognize the Implications of Economic Inequality
Notwithstanding its equal protection rhetoric, Ake represents
the full ascendancy ofJustice Harlan's position in Griffin and Douglas.
Ake eliminates all of the questions about equality and wealth that
Harlan found vexing and perhaps unanswerable. 128 Ake avoids the
pitfalls of the equality principle by turning exclusively to an ortho-
dox application of due process analysis. By doing so, Ake eliminates
the problem of the equality principle's lack of any logical limita-
show "that with any of these requested experts, he was denied access to evidence which
is material to either guilt or punishment, and... tangible prejudice" from the denial of
the expert help); Shelton v. State, 793 P.2d 866, 873-74 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (de-
fendant must show that denial of motion precludes "access to evidence which is material
to either guilt or punishment" and "substantial prejudice"); Munson v. State, 758 P.2d
324, 330 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (defendant denied expert assistance must show "prej-
udice by clear and convincing evidence").
A number of other courts have made more moderate demands on defendants mak-
ing requests for expert or investigative resources. E.g., Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d
640, 643-45 (11th Cir. 1991) (with some evidence of both sanity and insanity, court
should appoint an expert to assist defense, not neutral expert); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy,
919 F.2d 1091, 1103-05 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc)(state must provide psychiatric assist-
ance on mental capacity where defendant shows that the expert is "necessary to aid in a
proper defense," and that "without the expert the result of the trial would be unfair.");
United States v. St. John, 851 F.2d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[A] defendant must
show a reasonable probability that an expert would have aided in her defense, and that
the denial of an expert witness resulted in an unfair trial .... ); United States v. Sloan,
776 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985) ("clear showing to trial judge that his mental condi-
tion will be a significant factor at trial."); State v. Gambrell, 347 S.E.2d 390, 394 (N.C.
1986) (defendant need only show that his sanity will likely be a significant factor at trial,
not a prima facie showing of insanity). There is little in the way of a discernible pattern.
One cannot tell why one court seems to want to throw up substantial roadblocks to the
defense and another does not.
125 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1987)(en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
126 Id. at 712.
127 Id. (information necessary to prove entitlement to expert services must come at
pretrial motion stage of case); see also Harris, supra note 19, at 771 (Moore requires prov-
ing prima facie case of insanity before trial, without expert help necessary to show
insanity).
128 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362 (1963). Perhaps these questions are un-
answerable only if we refuse to question the basic assumptions of our political and eco-
nomic system.
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tion' 29 and the enormous and far-flung implications of the
principle. 13
0
What is striking, however, is that Ake's due process/basic tools
solution fails to come to grips with the effect of the poverty on the
outcomes of trials. Instead of asking how defendants' poverty influ-
ences justice and what might be done about this, Ake asks that we
balance the interests of the individual against the interests of the
state to determine whether a resource requested by a defendant is
worthwhile. The importance of the resource in enabling the
factfinder to arrive at a just determination of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt constitutes only one subsidiary part of the calculus. At
best, Ake offers only a partial solution to problems presented by the
equality principle; it relegates the questions the equality principle
tried to address to the realm of the unsolvable.
In the final analysis, Ake succeeds only in two limited ways. It
addresses some of the stronger criticisms of the equality principle-
its open-endedness, its failure to tell us how equal is equal and the
like. It also provides expert help to a small class of indigent defend-
ants-those whose cases turn on one issue, which issue turns on the
assistance of an expert. Indeed, "succeed" may be too strong a
word. After all, to focus on the excesses of the equality principle
does not solve the basic problem; to address the wealth question
only in the context of all-or-nothing cases falls far short of what is
needed.
The net effect of the abandonment of the search for an effective
constitutional method to address the problem is the institutionaliza-
tion of a two-tiered system of criminal justice. One type of justice
exists for those who can afford not only attorneys but the necessary
experts and investigators. Those who are indigent receive a wholly
different type ofjustice. As Professor Kamisar has put it, "[s]o long
as the indigent defendant's 'brand of justice' satisfies certain mini-
mal standards-passes government inspection, one might say-it
need not be the same brand of justice or the same 'choice' or 'prime'
grade of justice as a wealthy man's." 131 When this lack of funding
129 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
130 Id.
131 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 12, at 84 (quoting Kamisar, supra note 87, at 1-101 to 1-
108).
Having surveyed the weaknesses of the basic tools theory, it might be argued that
what is needed is not a new theory but a reinterpretation or tightening up of the basic
tools theory. That is not correct. Under due process analysis, anything tightened can be
loosened again; recall my comments supra about the malleability of due process. A court
will always come back to the same question: What process is due? As with questions of
equality, there will be no guiding principle to help answer the question. Under my
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for resources other than counsel is combined with the current finan-
cial strangulation of systems for providing the indigent with coun-
sel,132 the differences between the types ofjustice the rich and poor
receive become stark.
Ake leaves us, then, where we started. The equality principle,
though possessed of a noble aim, sweeps too broadly. Ake, by con-
trast, accomplishes too little. Some states have attempted statutory
remedies, but the assistance they provide is usually limited.1
33
theory, there is a goal, a guiding principle for courts to keep in mind: helping the
factfinder ascertain the truth. That is the source of its superiority to the other two
theories.
132 E.g., supra note 6; Michael deCourcy Hinds, Circumstances In Philadelphia Consign
Killers, N.Y. TiMES, June 8, 1992, at A7 (Philadelphia courts hand out second-highest
number of death sentences of any U.S. city, due to "prosecutors zealously seeking the
death penalty, judges refusing to pay for expert witnesses and a small group of over-
worked and generally overwhelmed defense lawyers"; as a result, some defense attor-
neys have filed a federal civil rights suit); Claudia MacLachlan, Defense Dollars Screech to
Halt, NAT'L L.J.,June 8, 1992, at 3 (with federal funding for paying private lawyers about
to run out, lawyers may wait until October 1992 to be paid, creating concomitant " 'sig-
nificant problems for the panel attorneys and their experts and their interpreters' ").
133 The leading statute is the federal Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3006A(e)(1),(3) (1988). The statute requires federal courts to grant requests by the
defendant for government-funded "investigative, expert, or other services" when the
services are "necessary for adequate representation" and the defendant cannot afford
them. While undoubtedly helpful, the federal statute and the state laws modeled on it
have significant shortcomings.
First, these statutes limit the amount of money available, often to small amounts.
E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (Supp. 1991) (maximum $500); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 31.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (maximum $1000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-80
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.05 § 1(d) (Vernon 1989
& Supp. 1992) (maximum $500). Some states allow defendants to exceed statutory lim-
its, but only with the explicit permission of the court, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 611.21 (Supp.
1992) (maximum of $1000 may be exceeded if court finds this necessary to provide for
services of unusual character and duration); NEV. REV. STAT. § 552.030 (1987) (maxi-
mum of $300 may only be exceeded if need to do so is certified by trial judge and presid-
ingjudge of district); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:6 (Supp. 1991) (maximum of $300
may be exceeded if court finds nature and quantity of services reasonably merits excep-
tion); W. VA. CODE § 29-21-14(e)(3) (1986) (maximum of $500 may be exceeded only
with prior court approval). At least two states commit the determination of the amount
available for expert services to the trial court's discretion. E.g., IowA CODE ANN.
§ 813.2, r. 19.4 (West 1983) (court determines reasonable compensation); ALM MASS.
R. CRIM. P. 41 (1979) (amount limited to what court deems reasonable), but see 30 Mass.
Prac. Series (Smith) § 492 (1970, Supp. 1978) (most judges put ceiling on amount);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207 (1990) (reasonable amount, as determined by court).
Second, many of these statutes apply only to murder or capital murder cases. E.g.,
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013(B) (1989) (funds available in capital murder cases
only; availability of experts in other cases solely a matter of court's discretion); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West Supp. 1992) (limited to capital murder cases or cases in
which defendant has prior murder conviction); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.024 (Bald-
win 1987) (limited to aggravated murder cases), or make expert services available only
on the issue of insanity, FLA. STAT. ANN. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.216 (West Supp. 1991) (lim-
ited to insanity defense); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 768.20a(3) (West Supp. 1992) (lim-
490 [Vol. 83
1992] THE CONSTITUTION AND TRUTH SEEKING 491
While Ake has inspired a great deal of scholarship,13 4 most of it does
not strike off in any new direction that promises to address the real
problem.13
5
III. A NEW APPROACH: THE TRUTH SEEKING THEORY
Instead of trying to make indigent defendants equal (under the
equality principle) or giving them basic tools (under Ake), I suggest
that courts use a theory geared to address directly the disparities of
wealth in the criminal justice system. This theory targets the impli-
cations of economic disparity in criminal justice by focusing on
whether the defendant's poverty could prevent the jury from hear-
ing all of the relevant evidence on contested issues. Based on the
Sixth Amendment, this theory would have judges ask two questions
in deciding whether to grant a request for expert services. First, is
the issue to which the requested resource pertains in dispute? Sec-
ond, is the information that could be brought to trial as a result of
ited to insanity defense); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1176 (West Supp. 1992) (limited to
cases in which sanity will be a significant factor).
Third, many of these statutes, including those already cited from Alabama, Arizona,
Texas, California, Tennessee, Massachusetts and West Virginia, make receiving any ex-
pert services at all-not just the amount of funds received-a matter solely within the
discretion of the court.
Other issues that these statutes fail to address include whether the defendant gets to
choose who the expert will be, and whether counsel must pay for expert services first, in
the hope that the court will, in its discretion, pay for the services. Perhaps worst of all,
some states cast the burden of paying for expert services on their already underfunded
public defenders by forcing them to divert the money from other needs in their budgets.
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-5 (West Supp. 1991) ("All necessary services and facili-
ties of representation (including investigation and other preparation) shall be provided
in every case. The factors of need and real value to a defense may be weighed against
the financial constraints of the Public Defender's office in determining what are the nec-
essary services and facilities of representation."); Gorman v. State, 507 A.2d 1160, 1164-
65 (Md. 1985) (public defender receives budget from state and has obligation to fund
expert services out of it, rather than seeking funding from court). All of this tells us that
while a statutory approach could help, existing statutes do not address the full scope of
the problem. Of course, most of the states not named here have not even tried a statu-
tory solution. See generally Mary F. Moriarty, Liberty, Justice... and Expertsfor All, 6 LAw &
INEQ. J. 247, 251-58 (1988).
134 See supra note 19.
135 E.g., Harris, supra note 19, at 780-82 (arguing that courts should interpret Ake's
significant factor test in terms of reasonableness, rather than proposing a new standard
altogether); Willis, supra note 19, at 1029-31 (proposing a clarifying gloss on Ake that
requires balancing materiality against cost, but remaining within the context of due pro-
cess); West, supra note 19, at 1358-61 (proposing an equal protection test or partial
version of the Mathews balancing test as an alternative to Ake). While some earlier schol-
arship explored the possibility of using either the Confrontation or Compulsory Process
Clauses, no commentator has gone beyond a basic level of analysis. Further, no one has
combined the two clauses with the right to present a defense, as I do here. See infra
notes 179-80.
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granting the defendant's request for expert services helpful to the
factfinder's decision? In other words, could this information, either
by itself or in combination with other information, be the basis for a
finding of reasonable doubt?
I will begin this section by examining these two questions in
greater depth. I will then explain the relationship of the truth seek-
ing theory to the purposes and context of the criminal justice sys-
tem, and demonstrate how the two questions will enable factfinders
to make determinations of guilt relatively unaffected by the defend-
ant's poverty. I will conclude the section by discussing the theory's
constitutional underpinnings.
A. THE TWO QUESTIONS
The two questions posed above form the heart of the truth
seeking theory. Instead of asking questions that are either unan-
swerable 36 or that fail to address the fundamental problem,
137
these questions force us to focus on the central objective 3 8 of the
criminal trial: ascertaining whether the state's allegations against the
accused are true beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Is the Issue in Dispute?
The first question-Is the issue for which expert assistance is
requested in dispute?-screens out requests for experts or investi-
gators on issues that the defendant will not actively contest.
Most criminal cases differ from Ake in an important respect:
They contain more than one issue. For example, a typical drug pos-
session case may include such issues as the legality of a search or
seizure, the defendant's dominion and control over the substance,
and the identity of the seized substance itself. Even in such a simple
case, however, the defendant may not contest all of these issues.
For example, the defendant may not contest that the substance
seized is illegal; rather, the dispute may center on one or both of the
other two issues. Without the first question, which screens out un-
contested issues, defendants would have little to lose by always re-
questing expert assistance on every issue.1 39 If the defense plans to
136 Under the equality principle, we must ask, "How equal is equal?", a question with
no obvious or logical answer. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
137 Ake's basic tools approach may address the problems of the equality principle, but
fails to present an alternative that successfully deals with the consequences of inequality
in criminal justice. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
138 See infra notes 141-45.
139 In order for the procedure I have outlined to make sense, the defense must have
some idea of what the issues in the trial will be. The timing of the request for expert
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dispute the issue, the court proceeds to the next question.
2. Would the Expert Service Bring Helpful Information to the Factfinder?
Alternatively, as phrased in the introduction to this section,
could the expert bring the factfinder information on the issue(s) in
dispute that, standing alone or in combination with other informa-
tion, could form the basis for a reasonable doubt?
This question, like the first, springs from the fact that most
cases are multi-faceted; the prosecution usually must prove a whole
chain of facts. The breaking or omission of any of the links in this
chain may result in an acquittal. If the expert could supply the
factfinder with information that could fatally weaken the chain of
evidence, then the request for the expert should be granted. Unlike
the cases based on Ake that impose very high barriers to defendants
seeking expert services, the truth seeking theory would not require
that the accused make out a full affirmative defense in order for the
court to grant a motion for expert services. Rather, the theory asks
only whether the expert could provide the court with helpful, rele-
vant information.140
Note the differences between the truth seeking theory, on the
one hand, and the equality principle and the basic tools theory on
the other. The equality principle supplies no guiding principle with
services therefore becomes important. See infra notes 285-88. Note also that given the
procedural changes I describe infra at notes 282-84, 288 and accompanying text, the
mere possibility of unearthing helpful information will not be enough to support a request
for expert services under the truth seeking theory. Further, the possibility of expert
testimony that would be merely cumulative will also not be enough to support a request.
See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
140 Students of the Federal Rules of Evidence will note the-similarity between the
standard proposed here and Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admissi-
bility of testimony by experts. Under Rule 702, expert testimony is admissible if it "will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"; the
second of my two questions also centers on helpfulness to thejury. There is, however, a
key difference. Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. As such, it con-
cerns only the testimonial role of experts. My theory is broader. It recognizes that
experts assist in other important ways: evaluating the prosecution and defense cases,
assisting in cross-examination of the prosecution's experts and the like. See, e.g., supra
notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
Were critics to say that what I have done is to restore the equality principle through
the back door of Rule 702, I would disagree. The problem with the equality principle is
that it does not-and perhaps cannot-tell us what equal is in any given situation. See
supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. The objective of my theory is to tell us how to
answer requests for resources from indigent defendants based on what we are actually
trying to accomplish-finding the truth of the state's allegations against the accused. It
is no surprise that this will in many cases result in indigent defendants being able to use
experts in the same way that defendants with money do. This is not, however, because
we care about them being, in some way, equal, but because of the interest the theory
promotes-an enhanced ability to find truth.
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which to select between worthy and unworthy requests for expert
services. While the principle acknowledges that inequality of re-
sources affects the criminal justice system, it does not help us under-
stand what to do about it, except to make things "more equal." The
basic tools approach does no better; it entitles defendants to due
process, but offers only a case-by-case formulation that erects pro-
hibitive barriers to expert services in all but the most extreme cases.
By contrast, the truth seeking theory offers criteria that are unam-
biguous. An issue either is or is not contested; if contested, expert
services either can or cannot produce helpful, probative evidence.
This obviates the need for answering how equal is equal enough
under the equality principle, or for divining when an expert service
is significant or basic enough to be required by the infinitely mallea-
ble Mathews due process formulation.
B. PURPOSE AND CONTEXT: ENHANCING THE ABILITY OF THE
FACTFINDER TO FIND THE TRUTH WITHIN THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM
To understand the truth seeking theory, we must first examine
the way the criminal justice system works-its goals and the context
within which it operates. With this information in mind, we can see
the superiority of the truth seeking theory to either the equality
principle or the basic tools test.
1. The Primary Goal: Finding the Truth
The criminal justice system, like most institutions, has many
objectives.14 1 Nevertheless, one goal emerges as preeminent: find-
ing the truth. 142 Indeed, unless finding the truth is a primary goal,
the criminal law cannot serve as a legitimate regulator of conduct or
moral guide.' 43 As Professor LaFave says, "[t]he discovery of the
141 See infra notes 146-60 and accompanying text.
142 On the place of truth in the criminal justice system, see Albert Alschuler, The Search
for Truth Continued, The Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. CoLo. L. REV.
67 (1982); William J. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?,
1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279; Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Monroe Freedman,Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1060 (1975); Edwin Meese, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAND. L. REV. 271
(1987); Charles Pulaski, Jr., Criminal Trials: A 'Search for Truth'or Something Else?, 16 CRIM.
L. BULL. 41 (1980); A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978
DUKE LJ. 921.
143 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20 (1991)
("Many participants in the criminal justice system believe that subordination of the truth
to any other value is indefensible. They believe that separating the innocent from the
guilty is not a casual concern of the criminal justice system, but its utmost goal."), citing
Meese, supra note 142, at 271.
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truth is an essential goal of any criminal justice process that is to
serve the ends of the substantive criminal law through effective en-
forcement of that law." 144 Without this goal, the criminal law would
be cast adrift, the mere tool of power, authority or politics. Even in
a criminal justice system which acknowledges other goals, as ours
does, truth finding remains paramount. In fact, during the 1970s
and 1980s, the Supreme Court made truth finding the explicit goal
of criminal adjudication. 145
2. Other Goals
Any fair comment on the criminal justice system recognizes that
truth finding, although predominant, is only one of a number of
goals the system strives to attain. 146 Among these other goals of the
144 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 33 (2d ed. 1982); see
alsoJoseph Grano, Response, XIV N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 97, 98 (1986) ("There is
a societal interest in having the truth determined in a criminal trial."); Charles H. White-
bread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure: The Recent Criminal Deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN LJ. 471, 471 (1985) (single criterion
against which Court evaluates provisions of Bill of Rights is "how much impact does the
right in question have on guilt determination at trial?").
145 E.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) (" '[T]he central purpose of a crimi-
nal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence...
(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 312 (1985) (suppression of unwarned, voluntary disclosure of guilt would block
factfinder's search for truth without justification); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722
(1975) (criminal trial is essentially a search for truth within the context of constitutional
safeguards); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974) (exclusion of unwarned, vol-
untary statement would deprive factfinder of available, relevant and trustworthy evi-
dence, contrary to "strong interest under any system ofjustice" in truth finding); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (defendant's right to testify is subject to obli-
gation to testify truthfully and may be tested by "the traditional truth-testing devices of
the adversary process."); Edward Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and the Criminal
Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 518 590 (1977) ("The Burger
Court's decisions reflect the view that the primary value deserving recognition in the
criminal process is accuracy."); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty
Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 957, 1007 (1989) (recognizing Court's emphasis on "the
central importance of accurate determination of the question of factual guilt"); Office of
Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Truth in Criminal Justice Series (1986), reprinted in 22
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437, 439 (1990) (advocating abolition of many aspects of established
rights that impair the search for truth); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the
Police: Individual Rights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH U. L.Q. 11, 18 (1988) (Burger
Court decisions "talked first and foremost about the truthfinding function of the crimi-
nal trial. The major goal of criminal procedure was no longer to remedy the disadvan-
tages of the poor or to control abuses of official power but to accurately separate the
guilty from the innocent."); Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An
Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 436-37
(1980) (the view that finding the truth is the central mission of the criminal justice sys-
tem "is amply supported by the Court's own rhetoric.").
146 The goals used here come from LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 144, at 33-43. The
treatment of the basic policy goals of the criminal justice system in this book is as
thoughtful as any other, and more comprehensive than most.
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criminal justice system, 147 the following are arguably the most im-
portant: protecting the innocent, respecting individual dignity,
equal justice and maintenance of an accusatorial system. All are
well-served by the truth seeking theory.
a. Protecting the Innocent
The criminal justice system must not only reliably convict those
who perpetrate crimes; it must also reliably exonerate those errone-
ously accused.' 48 To this end, numerous safeguards protect the in-
nocent. To do so, however, requires reaching beyond finding the
truth. We therefore seek to minimize the chances of the erroneous
conviction of an innocent person, even at the price of a greater
chance that a jury may acquit a guilty person.
149
Viewing the system as a whole, this makes some sense. The
criminal justice system relies on thejudgment of people, and people
make mistakes. In recognition of this fact, we attempt to err on the
side of being as sure as human beings can be that the innocent are
not convicted. Conviction of the innocent with any frequency would
undermine the very legitimacy of our criminal law; quite simply, it
would be morally reprehensible for the law to cause the innocent to
suffer. This is the source of our "fundamental value determina-
tion"'150 that "it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free."'u 5 A number of rules of constitutional dimen-
147 Among the goals of the system not discussed here are minimizing the burdens of
accusation and litigation, providing lay participation and maintaining the appearance of
fairness. Id. Additionally, LaFave views the adversary system as a goal (he says that a
goal of the criminal justice system is "[e]stablishing an [a]dversary [slystem of
[aldjudication"). By contrast, I view the adversary system as the context within which
the actors in the system work. I am not alone. E.g., Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyer's
Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 589 (1975) (adversary system is only a means to
attain the end of achieving "just determination of disputes," not an end in itself).
148 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 144, at 34.
149 Id. at 39.
150 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
151 Id. Professor Tom Stacy perceptively observes that opinions of the Supreme Court
seem to contain two different views of the importance of accuracy in criminal adjudica-
tion: A traditional view, in which the system is adjusted to make every effort to acquit the
innocent even if this means that some guilty persons go free, a view Stacy calls "inno-
cence weighted"; and an emerging view in which the overall number of accurate ver-
dicts, innocent or guilty, is paramount. Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369 (1991). In the latter view, changes in the
system that actually increase the number of innocent persons convicted would be accept-
able, as long as the total number of inaccurate verdicts-guilty and not guilty-goes
down. Id. at 1372. Stacy argues that this new view "effects a fundamental and dramatic
shift in the law"; indeed, it is at war with our traditional views of the reasonable doubt
standard and the importance of protecting the innocent. Id. at 1371-72. Those sub-
scribing to this new conception of accuracy might view the theory described here with
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sion protect the innocent, most notably the requirement that the
prosecution bear the burden of proving guilt, and that it carry this
burden beyond a reasonable doubt. 52
Note that the goal of protecting the innocent may exist in ten-
sion with the goal of truth finding. Indeed, the very idea that we
should take enormous care that the innocent not be punished, even
if this means that some guilty persons go free, explicitly acknowl-
edges that not all of the factually guilty will be punished. As with
other goals of the criminal justice system, protecting the innocent
may sometimes deflect the truth.' 53
The truth seeking theory promotes the protection of the inno-
cent by explicitly striving for more accurate and balanced presenta-
tion of facts to the judge or jury. Instead of wealth and poverty
determining what the factfinder considers, the need for information
that only an expert can provide will be the deciding factor.
b. Respecting Individual Dignity
The criminal justice system also promotes respect for the dig-
nity of individual human beings. For purposes of this discussion,
dignity means the conditions necessary to maintain the adult per-
sonality, such as the freedom to think and feel privately, without in-
terference from the state. 154 We strive for this goal in a number of
ways, such as through the constitutional prohibitions against com-
pelled self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures.
Like protecting the innocent, this goal may exist in tension with
the truth seeking function. For example, the prohibition against
compelled self-incrimination may lead to the exclusion of relevant
and highly probative evidence of guilt. This may result in some
guilty persons going free, but "the process accepts that sacrifice in
efficiency as a cost of preserving respect for human dignity" because
"preservation of social order and domestic tranquility require not
only freedom from crime, but also freedom from an overreaching
skepticism, since there is no way to gauge its effect on the overall number of accurate
verdicts. The truth seeking theory will serve the pursuit of both accuracy in verdicts and
protection of the innocent by making more information available to the factfinder than
just what the defendant can afford. Accuracy would be less of a slave to money. Further,
at least while the "innocence weighted" view of criminal procedure remains the domi-
nant approach, we must use a theory for expert services that errs on the side of ferreting
out reasonable doubt.
152 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979); Winship, 397 U.S. at 361; Stacy, supra
note 151, at 1371-72 and n.8.
153 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 144, at 34; Stacy, supra note 151, at 1370.




The truth seeking theory promotes individual dignity in the
same manner as the criminal justice system. Under the theory, ac-
cess to expert services to explore important issues does not depend
on wealth. Rather, defendants may have expert services based on
the configuration of their cases and the role an expert might play in
them.
c. Equal Justice
Professor LaFave calls this goal achieving equality in the appli-
cation of the process.' 56 The idea is that like defendants must be
treated alike, and that distinctions may be drawn between them only
"on grounds that are properly related to the functions of the pro-
cess."' 57 This goal was, of course, at the heart of the equality princi-
ple. The poverty of the defendant bears no proper relationship to
any function of the process.
The truth seeking theory promotes equal justice by assuring
that the defendant's poverty does not govern what information ulti-
mately makes its way to the factfinder. The theory seeks to keep
criminal justice focused on what the jury needs to know, rather than
on what evidence the defendant can afford to present.
d. Maintenance of an Accusatorial System
American courts operate under an accusatorial system. The
government has the responsibilities of coming forward with the ac-
cusation(s) against the defendant and proving them beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. If the government does not offer sufficient proof,
the factfinder must acquit.' 58 The defendant is presumed inno-
cent' 59 and may not be compelled to assist the government in prov-
ing the accusations against him.' 60 While this may frustrate truth
seeking by making it more difficult to convict the guilty, maintaining
an accusatorial system assumes that the government exercises its im-
mense power to prosecute under scrutiny. Put another way, the
process of prosecution should be difficult precisely because it can be
misused, to the great harm of the accused.
155 Id. at 42; see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-25
(1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Due process of law is not for the sole benefit of an
accused. It is the best insurance for the Government itself against those blunders that
leave lasting stains on a system of justice."); Dressier, supra note 143, at 21.
156 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 144, at 42.
157 Id.
158 See supra note 152.
159 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
160 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The truth seeking theory advances the maintenance of an accu-
satorial system by making the accused fully able to put the state to
its proof, regardless of economic circumstances. The theory en-
ables the accused to help check the government's power to convict,
regardless of poverty.
With all of these goals in mind-finding the truth, along with
the other four goals discussed-the strength of the truth seeking
theory becomes clear. It serves the primary goal of the criminal
justice process by focusing on truth seeking. It supplies the
factfinder with all the relevant evidence; none will be withheld be-
cause of the defendant's poverty, and thus our confidence in the re-
liability of the criminal trial as a way to ascertain the truth increases.
At the same time, it also promotes the other goals listed here. It
protects the innocent by assuring that all evidence that shows inno-
cence comes to light, rather than remaining hidden due to the de-
fendant's poverty. Respect for individual dignity and the mechanics
of accusatorial justice are maintained by allowing the defendant to
mount a defense relatively unencumbered by economic circum-
stances. Additionally, even though it does not depend upon the
Equal Protection Clause, the theory brings the defendant into a po-
sition like that of a person with resources, so that his poverty does
not virtually insure unequal justice before the law.
C. THE CONTEXT: THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
To understand the truth seeking theory, we must understand
the context within which it would operate. The criminal justice sys-
tem attempts to ascertain the truth within the context of an adver-
sary system. By the term adversary system, I mean a system of
adjudication in which neutral 16 1 judges and/or juries decide the is-
sues. In contrast to so-called inquisitorial systems,' 62 the prosecu-
tion and the defense-not the factfinder-develop and present the
evidence. Each of the parties attempts to persuade the factfinder of
the correctness of its contentions 163 within a "highly structured fo-
rensic procedure .. ,"164 Professors LaFave and Israel put it well:
The adversary model gives to the parties the responsibility of investi-
gating the facts, interviewing possible witnesses, consulting possible
161 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 144 at 35-36 & n.5.
162 Id.; KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 12, at 1359.
163 For other descriptions of the adversary system, see, e.g., KAMISAR ET AL., supra note
12, at 1359-64; STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DE-
FENSE 2 (1984); Gary S. Goodpaster, On the Theory of the American Adversary Criminal Trial,
78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987).
164 LANDSMAN, supra note 163, at 2.
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experts, and determining what will or will not be told. Each party is
expected to present the facts and interpret the law in the light most
favorable to its side, and through a searching counter-argument and
cross-examination, to challenge the soundness of the presentations
made by the other side. The judge and jury are then to adjudicate
impartially the issues posed by the conflicting presentations of the
parties.'
6 5
Some find the adversary system the best possible process for
producing accurate verdicts.' 66 This assertion rests on two assump-
tions. First, keeping factfinders uninvolved in the process of gather-
ing or presenting evidence prevents them from forming biases and
jumping to conclusions before complete development of the evi-
dence. 167 Second, putting the parties in charge of gathering and
presenting the evidence will guarantee the best possible develop-
ment of the factual record. Since the parties' self-interest dictates
that they will ferret out as much evidence favorable to them as possi-
ble, and since there are two parties with opposing self-interests, the
adversary system assures that the factfinder will see all relevant evi-
dence and its strengths and weaknesses.
168
Many commentators disagree strongly with these two assump-
tions, especially the second. 169 They argue that an adversary system
provides absolutely no assurance that all relevant evidence will be
found and presented to the tribunal. On the contrary, the self-inter-
est of one or even both parties may keep evidence of unquestioned
relevancy hidden. 70 The adversaries may turn the trial into a tour-
nament of tactics and obfuscation in which they distort or fail to
present probative facts, 17 1 sometimes even by agreement between
themselves. 72 This "battle of wits and guile, designed to mislead
the decisionmaker rather than to lead him to the truth" may further
distort the evidence because the adversary system "rests on the un-
165 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 144, at 35.
166 Id. at 34-35; KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 12, at 1359.
167 Kamisar, supra note 87, at 1359; LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 144, at 36.
168 See, e.g., LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 144, at 36; Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853, 862 (1975) ("[t]he very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that
partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that
the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."); see also United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984) (if the criminal justice system "loses its character as a confronta-
tion between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee [of effective assistance of counsel]
is violated.").
169 See, e.g., KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 12, at 1360 & n.a, and materials cited therein;
DRESSLER, supra note 143, at 20; see also supra note 127; Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of
Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083 (1975); Deborah Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 596-97 (1985).
170 Id.; Damaska, supra note 169, at 1093.
171 See, e.g., LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 144, at 36.
172 Damaska, supra note 169, at 1093 n.22.
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realistic proposition that the advocates will be roughly equal" in
ability and supporting resources.1 73 Further, while defense counsel
has a duty to the accused client-basically, a duty to do whatever can
be done within the limits of the system to win-there is no corre-
sponding duty to advance the truth. 174 At bottom, these critics con-
tend that the adversary system does not necessarily advance the
search for truth; in fact, it guarantees that the search will be more
difficult than it might be under another method of adjudication.
I do not wish to revisit these debates in any greater detail than I
have just done. Neither, however, do I wish to avoid their implica-
tions. The fact is that we determine guilt and innocence through
the adversary system. In order to reckon successfully with poverty's
influence on the criminal justice system, any theory must take into
account the way that the adversary process itself affects the accuracy
of factfinding. Regardless of whether presenting two opposing
sides is the best way to get to the truth, it is clear that the adversary
system cannot hope to ascertain the truth if only one side is
equipped to do battle. Without the contrasting proofs of the oppos-
ing sides, the factfinder is left to assume that uncontested facts are
true. In fact, this may not be the case at all; the defense may fail to
present opposing evidence simply because the defendant's poverty
does not allow for the investigation, preparation and presentation of
the evidence. The truth seeking theory seeks to promote truth find-
ing (as well as the other goals of the criminal justice system) by
equipping the indigent defendant with the resources necessary to
present the same evidence that any other defendant would.
Any other approach threatens to turn the trial and its goal of
finding the truth into a sham. Imagine the beginning of any crimi-
nal jury trial. We present the jury with the traditional partisan advo-
cates for defense and prosecution. The judge explains to the jury
that they are to hear evidence from both sides and decide the case
based on the evidence both sides present.'75 Thejury understands
173 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 144, at 36.
174 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983) (imposing a duty of
loyalty to the client), and Rule 1-6(a) (qualified duty to retain client confidences, even
where this may distort the presentatiton of the facts); compare MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981) (prosecutor's duty includes not only securing
convictions but promotion ofjustice); DRESSLER, supra note 143, at 21 ("[S]ome abridge-
ment of the truth currently is accepted in the adversary system of justice.").
175 See FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONS 1, 3-4 (1987)
(introducing advocates as partisans and explaining that jury decides guilt beyond rea-
sonable doubt based only on evidence and judge's instructions); PATTERN CRIMINALJURY
INSTRUCTIONS, SIXTH CIRCUIT DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION 1.02, 1.03, 1.04 (1991)
(same); EDWARD J. DEVITr & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, I FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND IN-
STRUCTIONS §§ 11.03, 11.11 (1977) (same).
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and assumes that both sides will present their strongest evidence in
the best possible light. 176 When evidence is not presented by the
defense, especially when that evidence is scientific or expert-based,
the jury will assume that the defense does not care to contest the
part of the state's case to which the evidence would have been rele-
vant. Worse still, the jury may assume that the defense did have its
own evidence on the issue but declined to present it because it sup-
ported the state, not the defendant. What may in fact be happening
is that the evidence was not presented by the defense simply be-
cause the defense could not afford to present it. Thejury, however,
will never know this.
I do not wish to be understood as advocating a sporting
chance 177 for the defendant to win. The important issue is not
whether the defendant has the same chance to win as the state.
Rather, we must focus on the task of the factfinder. How can we rely
on the jury's ability to find the facts when it may be doing so without
all of the evidence? Granted, the self-interest of the parties may
keep some of the evidence from reaching the factfinder. Given the
premises of the adversary system, however, self-interest is at least an
arguably acceptable criterion for advancing, or not advancing, evi-
dence. The poverty of the defendant, however, is not. If poverty
governs what evidence is heard in criminal courts, our whole system
suffers the consequences of the defendant's inability to dispute the
state's case.
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of our
system of criminal justice and the values which it advances depend
upon a constant, searching, and creative questioning of official deci-
sions and assertions of authority at all stages of the process .... It
follows that insofar as the financial status of the accused impedes vig-
orous and proper challenges, it constitutes a threat to the viability of
the adversary system.... Persons suffering [from poverty] are incapa-
ble of providing the challenges that are indispensable to satisfactory
operation of the system.... [T]he conditions produced by the finan-
cial incapacity of the accused are detrimental to the proper functioning
of the system of justice and . . . the loss in vitality of the adversary
system, thereby occasioned, significantly endangers the basic interests
176 "[T]hejury understands that advocates present a biased set of facts and arguments
concerning a dispute in an effort to present the most favorable picture of their position.
As a consequence of this principle of 'best case,' the jury assumes that each side's evi-
dence is no better than, and probably not as good as, the advocate presents it to be."
Michael J. Saks, Flying Blind in the Courtroom: Trying Cases Without Knowing What Works or
Why, 101 YALE LJ. 1177, 1178 (1992) (reviewing ROBERT H. KLONOFF & PAUL L. COLBY,
SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY: EVIDENTIARY TACTICS FOR WINNING JURY TRIALS (1990)).
177 See, e.g., Pye, supra note 142, at 926; Joseph Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth:
The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessional Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 677 (1986).
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of a free community.1 78
D. CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS
The truth seeking theory rests on three constitutional legs. The
first two come directly from the Sixth Amendment-the Confronta-
tion Clause1 79 and the Compulsory Process Clause. 180 The third,
the constitutional right to present a defense,"8 1 springs from the
Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses and the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Together, these three constitutional precepts assure
the adversary system's integrity. The truth seeking theory strives
for the same goal by making these mechanisms-the accused per-
son's rights to confront adverse witnesses and compel witnesses to
appear, and the right to present a defense-fully available to indi-
gent defendants.1 82 The following discussion will explore the rela-
tionship of the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses and
the right to present a defense to the adversary system, and it will
illustrate how the truth seeking theory will strengthen the process of
factfinding at trial.
1. The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause is critical to assuring that the jury
has sufficient information to make a reliable decision. Without con-
frontation, the adversary process breaks down, and the truth finding
process suffers.
The right of criminal defendants to confront adverse witnesses
has ancient origins.' 83 Colonial Americans found it so well estab-
178 Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of
Federal Criminal Justice 10-11 (1963).
179 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ). See infra notes 183-201
and accompanying text.
180 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... "). See
infra notes 202-18 and accompanying text.
181 See infra notes 219-30 and accompanying text.
182 Other commentators have suggested the Confrontation Clause as the basis for the
provision of expert services. E.g., Bowman, supra note 19, at 642-43 (recognizing neces-
sity of expert and investigative services for meaningful confrontation); West, supra note
19, at 1336-37, n. 80-81 & 1359-60 (Confrontation Clause as possible basis for expert
assistance). Commentators, and at least one court, have also suggested (again, without
much analysis) that the Compulsory Process Clause requires the provision of expert
services. E.g., Bowman, supra note 19, at 641-42; People v. Watson, 221 N.E.2d 645 (Ill.
1966). The Illinois court's reasoning has not been followed. The theory I propose is
the first to draw support from both the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses
and the right to present a defense.
183 Anne Rowley, The Sixth Amendment Right of Defendants to Confront Adverse Witnesses, 26
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lished in English common law that they included it in many of their
declarations and constitutions.18 4 While the initial function of con-
frontation was to combat the use of affidavits in the place of the
testimony of live witnesses to prosecute criminal cases,18 5 its pur-
poses broadened long ago.'1 6 The Supreme Court incorporated the
right to confrontation into the Fourteenth Amendment, applying it
to the states in 1965.187
The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence now
covers three related areas. The first area is literal, physical confron-
tation-that is, the right of the defendant to an actual face-to-face
encounter in court with those testifying against him.18 8 The second
area is the intersection of the right to confrontation and the use of
hearsay evidence.' 8 9 The third area-and the one on which I will
focus this discussion-is the right to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. The truth seeking theory promotes effective confrontation
by enabling indigent defendants to cross-examine adverse witnesses
with necessary expert services.
The core goal of the Confrontation Clause is the search for
truth. 190 Cross-examination, implicit in confrontation, is a central
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1547, 1547-54 (1989) (tracing the history of the clause back as far as
1552). Rowley's note is an excellent overview of the history and current jurisprudence
of the right of confrontation.
184 Id. at 1551-52; Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988) (right of confrontation
recognized even before right to jury trial).
185 Rowley, supra note 183, at 1547, 1550-51; but see White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736,
744 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("There is
virtually no evidence of what the drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to
mean."); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[T]he Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment.").
186 Rowley, supra note 183, at 1550-56. The Supreme Court has made clear, as re-
cently as 1992, that the Confrontation Clause covers much more than prosecution by
affidavit. White, 112 S. Ct. at 740-41 (explicitly rejecting view of concurring opinion and
U.S. Government as amicus curiae that limited purpose of Confrontation Clause was to
prevent the practice of prosecuting a defendant through affidavits without presenting
witnesses in person).
187 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
188 The Supreme Court has explored this area in recent cases in which states have
allowed children to testify in sexual abuse cases without having to face the accused.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (Confrontation Clause did not absolutely pro-
hibit victim of child sexual abuse from testifying outside of defendant's presence on
closed circuit television); Coy, 487 U.S. 1012 (allowing child victims of sexual assault to
testify against defendant behind opaque screen violated defendant's right of
confrontation).
189 The Court has explored the issues arising in this area and their many permutations
in a number of cases. E.g., White, 112 S. Ct. at 743; United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Green, 399 U.S. 149; Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
190 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-20; Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987); see also
Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (identifying core values and goals of confrontation similarly); see
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part of what makes the adversary system work. If the adversary sys-
tem is designed to ferret out the truth by presenting to the
factfinder the strongest evidence both sides can find, cross-examina-
tion supplies the critical alternative view of each side's evidence.'9 1
For this reason, Dean Wigmore called cross-examination the "great-
est legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."' 92 It is
easy to see why. When cross-examined, the witness testifies under
oath, "impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guard-
ing against the lie by the possibility of a penalty of perjury."' 93 If
the witness intends to lie, he must lie in public under hostile prob-
ing. The cross-examiner will, of course, make every effort to expose
not only deliberate deceit but biases and difficulties of memory and
perception.' 9 4 The jury will observe all this and the witness's de-
meanor while testifying, and use it to evaluate credibility.'9 5
Of course, cross-examination is not unlimited, either as to its
method or its extent. 196 Nevertheless, the Court has construed the
right to cross-examine broadly precisely because of its strong con-
nection to the ability of the factfinder to ascertain the truth. 1 7 This
also Note, An Argument for Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 1880, 1887 (1992) ("[C]onfrontation grants a defendant the right to challenge the
prosecution's evidence before the finder of fact.").
191 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-24, 227 (1967) (post-indictment
line-up without presence of counsel violated Sixth Amendment right to counsel, be-
cause, inter alia, counsel would not be able to meaningfully cross-examine state's wit-
nesses about line up; counsel's presence at line up "operates to assure that the accused's
interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecu-
tion."); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (in cross-examination,
"the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.").
192 JOHN WIGMORE, 5 EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940), quoted with approval in California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
193 Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
194 E.g., MAUET, supra note 7, at 226-30, 236-38.
195 Green, 399 U.S. at 158; see also Rowley, supra note 183, at 1551 n.27 (summarizing
five reasons supporting the confrontation right explained by Sir Matthew Hale in his
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (including desirability of public testimony,jury's ability to
evaluate witness and witness's demeanor, and superiority of live testimony to limited
and carefully presented written answers)).
196 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1986) (per curiam). For example, in Penn-
sylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's re-
fusal to allow a defendant in a child abuse case access to confidential information, even
though the defendant made a plausible argument that the information could have made
a difference in the outcome of his trial. Id. at 51-54.
197 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (error not to allow cross-exami-
nation of prosecution witness about dismissal of pending charge because the jury might
have found that the dismissal "furnished the witness with a motive for favoring the pros-
ecution."); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (error to prohibit cross-examina-
505
DAVID A. HARRIS
highlights the intimate relationship that exists between the Confron-
tation Clause and cross-examination on the one hand, and the
strength of the adversary process on the other. Cross-examination
is "critical for ensuring the integrity of the factfinding process";198 it
is "the principal means by which the believability of a witness and
the truth of his testimony are tested."'199 By exposing bias, de-
meanor, perceptual and memory difficulties-in short, by showing
the factfinder an interpretation of the facts different from those the
witness testifies to on direct examination-cross-examination helps
sift the true from the false.
Even Ake recognizes this. The importance of the psychiatrist in
Ake lies not only in the ability to present an insanity defense; the
psychiatrist also helps the defendant to cross-examine the state's ex-
pert(s) .2oo Thus the role of the expert includes not only digging out
facts and interpreting them, but helping to test the state's evidence.
Without expert services, "the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth" 20 ' may not start. Indigent defendants will
again be left to fend for themselves, and the accuracy and integrity
of the truth finding process in their cases may well suffer. By giving
these defendants greater access to expert services, the truth seeking
theory makes cross-examination an effective tool for everyone.
2. The Compulsory Process Clause
The Compulsory Process Clause gives the defendant the same
power to obtain witnesses that the state has. The clause makes the
state's machinery for insuring the attendance of witnesses at trial-
subpoenae, backed by the court's power to hold those disobeying its
orders in contempt-available to all. 20 2 The truth seeking theory
promotes accuracy in verdicts by making the right to compel wit-
nesses to appear worth something in cases in which expert services
are needed; if, practically speaking, experts are unavailable to indi-
gent defendants, the right to compulsory process has no value.
tion about juvenile's otherwise confidential juvenile criminal record); see Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (right to cross-examine not absolute, but its denial
calls into question the " 'integrity of the fact finding process' "and requires close exami-
nation of competing interests); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (cross-examina-
tion found so essential that denial of defendant's right to cross-examine is
"constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of preju-
dice would cure it.").
198 Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987).
199 Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.
200 E.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80-82 (1985).
201 See supra note 192.
202 STEPHEN A. SALZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1017 (3d ed. 1988).
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The history of the Compulsory Process Clause is sparse.20 3 By
the end of the eighteenth century, the idea of compulsory process
was well-rooted enough that the inclusion of the clause in the Bill of
Rights stirred little debate.20 4 With only one notable exception, 205
the Supreme Court said nothing about the clause until Washington v.
Texas206 in 1967. In that case, 20 7 the Court found the exclusion of
the accomplice's testimony violated the Compulsory Process
Clause.208 The Texas law in question "denied [the defendant] the
right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally
capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and
whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the de-
fense," 20 9 the Court said. "The Framers of the Constitution did not
intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to
secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right
to use." 210
The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of the Compul-
sory Process Clause just five years later in Webb v. Texas.211 As the
defendant's only witness prepared to testify, the trial judge gratui-
tously admonished the witness on the dangers of perjury to such an
extent that the witness refused to testify.2 1
2
203 See Kevin C. Boyle & Daniel A. Cunningham, The Compulsory Process Clause, 26 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1575, 1575-78 (1989); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73
MICH. L. REV. 71, 90-108 (1973) [hereinafter Compulsory Process 1].
204 Boyle & Cunningham, supra note 203, at 1578; Compulsory Process I, supra note 203,
at 90-91.
205 The exception was the trial of Aaron Burr. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30
(C.C.D. Va. 1807)(No. 14,692d). Chief Justice John Marshall, presiding at trial as a
circuit judge, read the Compulsory Process Clause expansively. In ruling on Burr's
motion for pretrial production of critical letters so that he might prepare his defense,
Marshall stated that "since the compulsory process clause was designed to enable a de-
fendant to present a defense, the defendant must be allowed time prior to trial to pre-
pare that defense." Boyle & Cunningham, supra note 203, at 1578-80 (quotation and
footnote omitted); Compulsory Process I, supra note 203, at 101-08.
206 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
207 In Washington, the defendant wished to call an accomplice as a witness. The ac-
complice had already been convicted of the crime. Id. at 16. The accomplice would
have testified that the defendant "pulled at him and tried to persuade him to leave and
that [the defendant] ran before [the accomplice] fired the fatal shot." Id. The trial court
refused to allow the accomplice to testify based on Texas statutes that barred any co-
participants in the same crime from testifying as witnesses for each other. Id. at 17-18.
208 Id. at 22-23.
209 Id. at 23.
210 Id. The Court also found that the right to compulsory process applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law. Id. at 17-
18.
211 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per curiam).
212 Upon defense counsel's objection to the unusual admonition by the court, the
court said, "Counsel, you can state the facts, nobody is going to dispute it. Let him decline
to testify." Id. at 96 (emphasis supplied).
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The Supreme Court said that the actions of the judge in Webb
had the same effect that the Texas statutes had in Washington-both
kept the defendant from presenting relevant and material evidence,
the production of which the defendant had a constitutional right to
compel. It would make no sense for the Constitution to guarantee
this right if a temperamental or biased judge could nullify it at
will.
2 1 3
Viewed through these cases, it is hard to see how the Compul-
sory Process Clause could not be part of the fabric of fundamental
fairness. The primary goal of the criminal justice system is to deter-
mine the truth of the government's allegations. The Confrontation
Clause facilitates the search for the truth by requiring that the state
put on most of its evidence through live witnesses who can be cross-
examined. By itself, however, the Confrontation Clause would not
always be sufficient; it requires the Compulsory Process Clause as
its complement. If the Confrontation Clause and the right to cross-
examination that it protects allows the defense to challenge the
state's evidence, the Compulsory Process Clause gives the defense a
critical tool it needs to put on its own evidence. In other words,
both confrontation and compulsory process are necessary to mount
a defense; neither would be sufficient by itself.
2 14
Yet we can also see that without necessary expert services, the
right to compulsory process becomes hollow. Clearly, the right to
compulsory process is aimed at allowing the defense to present its
own witnesses to the jury.215 The purpose of this right leads us
directly back to our discussion of the adversary system: The prose-
213 See also, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (state rule prohibiting use of all
hypnotically refreshed testimony violates, inter alia, the Compulsory Process Clause).
Like the right to confrontation, the right to compulsory process is not absolute. For
example, in United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982), the defendant
claimed that the illegal aliens the government charged him with transporting would have
testified on his behalf except for the fact that the government deported them before the
trial. Id. at 861. The Supreme Court said that this did not violate the Compulsory
Process Clause absent "some plausible showing of how [the] testimony would have been
both material and favorable to [the] defense" and not merely cumulative. Id. at 867. In
other words, the right to compulsory process does not necessarily extend to all wit-
nesses who could be available at trial absent direct government interference. Id. See also
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975) (right to compulsory process does not
protect defense from use of exclusion of witness as sanction; the clause and the Sixth
Amendment "'[do] not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate
demands of the adversarial system ...."); but see Ronson v. Commissioner of Correction,
463 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (discussing limits on the extent to which non-compli-
ance with procedural rules can result in the loss of a defense). Nevertheless, the right to
compulsory process remains a part of the guarantee of fundamental fairness that under-
lies all criminal trials.
214 See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
215 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).
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cution and defense present the factfinder with opposing views of the
facts. Experts, however, do not simply wait to be called as witnesses
with information in hand. Rather, the defense must retain and com-
pensate them based on the work and time involved.2 16 It is only
then that experts become witnesses. In other words, it is not only
compulsion that makes the difference; expert witnesses will appear
only if paid. Therefore, the right to compel the appearance of the
expert means nothing without the economic wherewithall to pay for
the expert's services. The truth seeking theory thus puts real force
behind the promise of the Compulsory Process Clause.
Some typical fact witnesses may present similar difficulties. The
problem is not that fact witnesses necessarily expect to be paid;
rather, fact witnesses sometimes cannot be compelled to appear un-
til they are found. Even if counsel alone could manage to have pro-
cess served on a witness (a dubious assumption, given current
caseloads for defenders of indigent clients2 17), determining whether
the defense should compel the witness to testify requires at least a
preliminary interview that an investigator should conduct or ob-
serve.2 18 Thus, without the resources to pay experts and investiga-
tive personnel to find and interview fact witnesses, the right to
compulsory process becomes exactly what the Supreme Court
feared in Washington v. Texas-an empty right. By contrast, the truth
seeking theory protects the right to compulsory process by enabling
indigent defendants to retain experts and to find and interview fact
witnesses. It puts real force behind the right.
3. The Right to Present a Defense
The rights to confrontation and compulsory process combine
to form the constitutional right to present a defense. This right,
which also finds support in the Due Process Clause, guarantees the
defendant the right to present evidence to the factfinder, whether
through confrontation or the presentation of defense witnesses, in
order that the process of finding the truth go forward with all rele-
216 See Grano, supra note 144, at 98 (equality not possible in a system in which people
may pay for services of attorneys).
217 See supra note 6.
218 See supra note 139; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE
4-4.3(d) (1990) (lawyer should not interview witness alone; interview should be con-
ducted by, or in presence of, third person, such as investigator, because of danger of
impeachment requiring lawyer to serve as witness and therefore to withdraw from case);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B), DR 5-102(A) (1981);
United States v. Vereen, 429 F.2d 713 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Porter, 429
F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text, which de-
scribes a mechanism for a preliminary interview or investigation.
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vant evidence. Just as it promotes the purposes of the confrontation
and compulsory process clauses, the truth finding theory supports
the right to present a defense by assuring that the facts of the case,
not poverty, determine whether the jury hears a defense.
Professor Peter Westen, an astute examiner of the Confronta-
tion and Compulsory Process Clauses, 2 19 finds these two clauses to
be opposite sides of the same coin, separate but complementary.
"After all, the confrontation clause and the compulsory process
clause have a common purpose: Both are designed to secure the
attendance of witnesses in order to enhance the ability of a defend-
ant to elicit and present testimony in his defense." 220 The Supreme
Court explained this intertwining of confrontation, compulsory pro-
cess and the right to present a defense in Washington v. Texas.
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their at-
tendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense,
the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the
prosecution's to the jury, so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as
an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for
the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present
his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental
element of due process of law.
22 1
The Supreme Court brought the Confrontation, Compulsory
Process and Due Process Clauses together in Chambers v. Missis-
219 Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1978) [hereinafter Confrontation and Compulsory Pro-
cess]; Peter Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 191 (1975); Compulsory Process
I, supra note 203.
220 Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 219, at 588-89; see also Faretta v. Cali-
fornia, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) ("The Sixth Amendment includes a compact statement
of the rights necessary to a full defense.... [T]hese rights are basic to our adversary
system of criminal justice."); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112 (1970) (Black, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("All of these [Sixth Amendment] rights are
designed to shield the defendant against state power."); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring
the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 581-86 (1988).
221 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). When the Court spoke in Webb, five
years later, it repeated these words with approval. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98
(1972).
Washington was not the first time the Supreme Court discussed this issue. The Court
foreshadowed the right to present a defense in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). In that
case, a person appeared before a "one man grand jury" (a single trial judge) which-in a
single secret proceeding-found him uncooperative and evasive, convicted him of con-
tempt and sentenced him to jail. Id. at 259. The Supreme Court found this proceeding
reminiscent of the Star Chamber and the Spanish Inquisition and violative of due pro-
cess. Id. at 268-69. "A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and
an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in our
system ofjurisprudence: and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the
witnesses against him, to offer testimony and to be represented by counsel." Id. at 273.
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sippi.222 Chambers was arrested for murder.223 Another person,
McDonald, made but later repudiated a sworn, written confes-
sion.224 McDonald also confessed orally to three other persons. 225
When the state did not call McDonald as a witness at trial, the de-
fense was forced to do so, but was unable to cross-examine McDon-
ald under Mississippi's "voucher" rule.226 Chambers was also
prohibited from calling as witnesses the three persons to whom Mc-
Donald confessed.
227
The Supreme Court found that these actions violated the Con-
stitution. Tying the Confrontation and Compulsory Process
Clauses to the defendant's right to receive a fair trial under the Due
Process Clause, the Court enunciated a constitutional right to pres-
ent a defense.
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence,
the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusa-
tions. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call
witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential
to due process .... Both of these [are] elements of a fair trial .... 
22 8
The right to present a defense furthers the search for truth.
229
222 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
223 Id. at 287.
224 Id. at 287-88.
225 Id. at 289.
226 Id. at 291-92. The "voucher" rule required that to cross-examine a witness it had
called, a party must show that a witness was "adverse" in the sense that the witness
"point[ed] the finger" at the party calling the witness. Id.
227 The trial court ruled the testimony of these witnesses was inadmissible as hearsay.
Id. at 292-93.
228 Id. at 294-95. This right to present a defense has been affirmed by the Supreme
Court in many other cases. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987) (right
to confrontation is "designed to promote reliability in the truth finding functions of a
criminal trial."); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 n.10 (1987) (right to present one's
own testimony is, inter alia, an essential part of due process of law in an adversary sys-
tem, and is implicit in the Compulsory Process Clause); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 226-27 (1967) ("The security of [the right to a fair trial] is as much the aim of the
right to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of the Sixth Amendment-the right of
the accused to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation and his right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favor.").
229 See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1988) (calling right to present
defense by compelling witnesses to attend trial "an essential attribute of the adversary
system itself"); Rock, 483 U.S. at 63 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (calling right to testify
on one's own behalf truth furthering); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986)
(right to present a defense constitutionally essential for a fair trial); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (characterizing need to develop and present facts in
adversary proceeding as fundamental to integrity of, and public confidence in, the crimi-
nal justice system); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 302 (1973) (confronta-
tion and compulsory process are both basic components of right to defense and
essential to truth finding).
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Without the right to present a defense, there is no guarantee that
the accused can put evidence before the factfinder, and confidence
in the truth seeking mission of the adversary system sinks. There-
fore, we cannot feel satisfied with the current system, in which the
rights to confrontation, to compulsory process and to present a de-
fense apply only to those with the money to pay for the expert serv-
ices necessary to make these rights worth something.23 0 The truth
seeking theory gives content to these constitutional provisions by
supplying the resources necessary for their exercise when doing so
would help attain the system's primary goal-finding the facts. The
theory supports the constitutional rights designed to make real the
assumptions of the adversary system-that the prosecution and de-
fense present the strongest, relevant available evidence to the
factfinder, which can then arrive at the most accurate decision possi-
ble. By gearing the provision of expert services to the ability of the
factfinder to determine facts, the truth seeking theory points the
criminal justice system in the right direction.
IV. How WELL DOES THE TRUTH SEEKING THEORY WORK?
Any proponent of a new theory must answer a basic question:
Does the new theory represent an improvement over the current
way of doing things? We cannot tell with mathematical certainty
whether the truth seeking theory would supply us with more reliable
verdicts. We can, however, make more than an educated guess. By
applying the truth seeking theory to a number of common types of
cases, I will demonstrate in the next section of the discussion that
the theory works better than the basic tools approach.
For a certain small set of cases, the basic tools theory will work
well, in that it will bring the jury all the relevant information. These
are cases in which one issue determines the outcome, like Ake it-
self.23 ' Yet many cases do not fit the one-issue mold. The typical
criminal case depends not on one fact, but on a chain of interdepen-
dent facts, all of which the state must prove. Consequently, most
indigent defendants usually will not receive expert services under
the basic tools theory because their cases do not present the court
230 This problem seems especially serious given the high percentage of cases in the
system for which these kinds of funds are not available. Doubts about our ability to find
the truth thus occur in a large number of cases. See ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., INDIGENT
DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL 100 (1992) (disparity in available re-
sources between prosecution and indigent defense attorneys is greatest in area of ex-
perts and investigators).
231 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
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with all-or-nothing situations. 23 2 This results injuries not having all
the relevant evidence needed to reach an accurate verdict.
By contrast, given the two questions the court would ask under
the truth seeking theory, 233 indigent defendants would receive ex-
pert services whenever it might make a difference to the outcome of
the case. Unlike the basic tools approach, the theory I propose will
build confidence that juries base verdicts on all the relevant evi-
dence, and that no evidence is withheld simply because of the de-
fendant's poverty. Since the presentation of the strongest available
evidence from both the prosecution and the defense remains a
linchpin of our truth finding process, the truth seeking theory will
bolster our ability to get at the truth.
To demonstrate this, I will begin by discussing the use of scien-
tific evidence in multi-issue cases in general. I will then use several
common types of cases to show that the truth seeking theory would
help important and relevant information reach the factfinder that
otherwise could remain hidden under the basic tools theory.
A. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN GENERAL
While important in modem criminal litigation,234 scientific evi-
dence does not always determine the outcome of cases in which it
appears. Rather, scientific testing more often provides some, but
not all, of the evidence necessary to convict.23 5  Moreover,
factfinders should view scientific evidence with skepticism. While
crime laboratories may carry the government's imprimatur, they can
and do produce flawed results. One study of 240 forensic laborato-
ries found that, at best, only twenty percent of the laboratories pro-
duced completely accurate results in simple tests on drugs, firearms,
blood, glass and the like. 23 6 Similarly, the National Academy of Sci-
232 See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. Even if Ake were not read this
narrowly, it would still present problems. See supra note 131.
233 See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
234 See supra note 7. In fact, some have argued that scientific or other expert evidence
has become so important that it can usurp the factfinder's function. See, e.g., CLEARY,
supra note 7, at § 202. (probative value of scientific evidence to be weighed "against the
dangers of misleading the jury who may attach exaggerated significance to the tests.").
235 For example, scientific testing can tell us whether a seized substance is, in fact, an
illegal drug, or whether a particular gun fired a recovered bullet; it cannot, however, tell
us whether the defendant possessed the drug or fired the bullet.
236 Decker, supra note 19, at 577-79 (1982), discussing JOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL.,
LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH PROGRAM (National Institute of Law En-
forcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. De-
partment ofJustice, July 1978); Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Sdentific Evidence, and




ences has recently cautioned against the unquestioning use of DNA
"fingerprinting," 23 7 a technology seen by some as infallible.23 8
The point is not that we either should or could rely less on sci-
entific evidence. To do so would be neither desirable nor possible;
forensic science has become an invaluable tool in the arsenal of
modem law enforcement. 23 9 Rather, these studies show us the im-
portance of assessing the evidence presented by experts as carefully
as possible.240 And, as Ake recognized, 24' there is often no better
way (and sometimes no other way) to expose the flaws in forensic
evidence than with the help of an expert in the same field.242
The possibility of inaccuracy in forensic science magnifies the
difficulties inherent in Ake's basic tools approach. The Ake standard
provides the indigent defendant with expert services only when the
issue to which the services are germane is outcome- determinative.
Since many cases do not fit this pattern, most indigent defendants
will not get expert services. This will occur despite the fact that the
scientific evidence should and could be challenged due, if nothing
else, to its strong potential for inaccuracy. Thus under the basic
tools approach, some verdicts will depend on scientific evidence that
is both unchallenged and inaccurate. By contrast, the truth seeking
theory will allow indigent defendants to test the prosecution's scien-
tific evidence through the use of their own experts.
With these general comments about scientific evidence in mind,
I will now discuss common types of cases and defenses in which ex-
pert services can play critical roles.
237 NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992); Don
J. DeBenedictis, DNA Report Raises Concerns, 78 A.B.A. J. 20 (July 1992).
238 E.g., DeBenedictis, supra note 237, at 20 (quoting National Academy of Sciences
report committee memberJudgeJack B. Weinstein, U.S. District Court, Eastern District
of New York: "DNA has been 'touted as a new form of sure-fire evidence,' Weinstein
said. 'It's not. It is a very powerful tool, but it has to be used carefully.' "); Giannelli,
supra note 236, at 796 (noting numerous references to DNA evidence as, e.g.,
"'foolproof.' ").
239 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE XXi-xxiii
(1986); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Relia-
bility of Scientific Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (use of scientific evidence has "increased
significantly"); Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects of Forensic Science in the Adjudi-
cation of Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1748 (1987) (one-quarter of surveyed
jurors would have changed votes from guilty to not guilty in the absence of scientific
evidence).
240 See also Giannelli, supra note 239, at 688-92 (demonstrating significant risk of error
in forensic testing); Giannelli, supra note 236, at 795-97 (same).
241 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79-82 (1985).
242 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIs. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1991)
("Whole categories of cases are dominated by issues that can only be resolved with ex-
pert knowledge.").
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B. SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense claims often arise in homicide and assault cases.
243
A person who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of
bodily harm may use a reasonable amount of force against another
when necessary to protect himself.244 Generally speaking, the cen-
tral criteria in self-defense cases are the reasonableness of the de-
fender's belief in danger and the reasonableness of the defender's
response.245 Self-defense thus presents a host of issues, none of
which may be totally dispositive, but all of which may affect the ver-
dict. All fairly cry out for investigative and expert services. I will
divide these issues into two broad groups.
1. Victim as Aggressor
To measure the reasonableness of a defendant's belief in dan-
ger and the reasonableness of his response, the jury may consider
whether the victim was, in fact, the aggressor. The law allows a de-
fendant in an assault or homicide case to introduce evidence of the
reputation of the victim for aggressive or violent behavior.246 This
may take the form of testimony about the victim's reputation or a
witness's opinion of the victim, 247 or evidence of specific instances
of conduct. 248 Courts admit reputation and opinion evidence to
show that the victim was the aggressor, and reputation, opinion and
prior acts evidence to prove the reasonableness of the defendant's
fear of immediate harm at the hands of the victim. 24
9
Given the almost outsized importance of this type of evidence
in a self-defense case, presenting it to the jury becomes critical. Ob-
taining this evidence requires thorough and time-consuming investi-
gation. While this investigation begins with defense counsel's first
interview with the defendant, 250 it requires much more. An investi-
gator251 must locate and interview persons who have known the vic-
243 CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 32.29.
244 E.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229-30 (1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1007 (1973); CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 32.29; JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 191 (1987); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1)
(1985); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 462-84 (2d ed. 1988).
245 E.g., CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 32.29.
246 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2); CLEARY, supra note 7, at § 193; CRIMINAL PRACTICE
INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 32.35; EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS
120-23 (2d ed. 1989); MAuET, supra note 7, at 143.
247 FED. R. EVID. 405(a); IMWINKELRIED, supra note 246, at 123.
248 FED. R. EVID. 405(b); CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 32A5; IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 246, at 123.
249 CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 32.44-45.
250 Id. at 32.31.
251 The word choice here is deliberate. While attorneys may be present for witness
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tim; these witnesses can provide valuable insight into the reputation
of the victim for violence or evidence of prior violent acts.2 52 The
defendant can suggest or locate persons who may have this informa-
tion only when the defendant knows the victim, which will not al-
ways be the case. Even when the defendant knows the victim,
however, the defendant may be of little help. He may not realize
that a potential self-defense argument exists and unknowingly with-
hold critical information,253 or he may be incarcerated and unable
to help find witnesses. 254 Without the help of an investigator, the
defendant will find himself unable to take advantage of important
and well-accepted avenues of defense, and therefore incapable of
presenting the full picture to the factfinder. The factfinder will then
base its conclusions on incomplete evidence.
Certainly, courts applying Ake's basic tools standard would
rarely grant requests for investigators to locate witnesses because
single issues or witnesses in self-defense cases are seldom disposi-
tive alone. Rather, the factfinder would assess the credibility of the
witness(es), and consider it together with supporting and contrary
evidence. By contrast, a court applying the truth seeking theory
would grant requests for investigators in most self-defense cases.
First, the issues-reasonableness of defendant's belief in the neces-
sity of the use of force and the reasonableness of the amount of
force used-will often be contested. Second, an investigator could
produce information highly relevant to the factfinder's decision.
2. Scientific Evidence in Self-Defense Cases
The circumstances of any violent crime can raise a number of
self-defense issues that can be resolved only through the use of sci-
entific evidence. For example, victims of violent assaults may be
intoxicated by drugs or alcohol, either or both of which may affect
interviews, having the interview conducted by a trained investigator (or at least having
an investigator present) allows for impeachment at trial, if necessary, without the danger
of the removal of defense counsel to become a witness. Lest it seem that this is a mistake
or danger faced only by the incompetent or underfunded defense attorney, see David
Johnston, Weinberger Pleads Not Guilty in Iran-Contra Case, N.Y. TIMES,June 20, 1992, at 10
(defense counsel moves to disqualify the lead federal prosecutor because the prosecutor
is cited in the indictment as a witness to defendant's allegedly false assertion).
252 CRIMINAL PRACTICE. INsTrrum, supra note 7, at 32.43. This evidence may also
come from the defendant, but would be subject to the most basic kind of attacks for bias.
See MAUET, supra note 7, at 303 (prosecutor should tell jury that defendant cannot be
believed because defendant obviously has most to lose and therefore greatest motiva-
tion to lie).
253 CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 32.30.
254 Id. at 1.1 (whether defendant is detained or released pending trial has a large im-
pact upon many subsequent aspects of the case, including investigation).
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behavior and cause aggressiveness. A toxicologist could perform
tests that would tell the factfinder about the presence and amount of
drugs or alcohol in a decedent's body at the time of death. 255 Evi-
dence of intoxication of the victim may therefore be important; how-
ever, depending on the prosecution's theory of the victim's conduct,
intoxication may not be dispositive by itself because it rarely shapes
human behavior alone. At best, intoxication may corroborate be-
haviors consistent with it, such as aggression. 256 Therefore, a court
acting under the basic tools theory would not fund expert services
necessary to produce evidence of the amount of a drug or alcohol in
a victim's body, while courts acting under the truth seeking theory
would.
Similarly, forensic pathologists can supply valuable information
concerning causes and time of death, weapons used to inflict partic-
ular wounds and other circumstances of the victim's death.257 Pa-
thologists, who are experts in the investigation of gunshot
wounds,258 are able to draw inferences from the examination of the
entry, course and exit of bullets that penetrate the human body.259
These types of evidence could support a self-defense theory by indi-
cating whether the decedent was, for example, leaning forward in an
attacking posture.26 0 Like the expert services already discussed,
however, pathologists will not always produce dispositive evidence;
rather, they will often produce evidence that will support or contra-
dict a self-defense theory in relevant ways. Under the basic tools
theory, requests for the help of pathologists in self-defense cases
may be denied, since this type of expert testimony will rarely decide
a case alone. Under the truth seeking theory, courts would be likely
to grant such requests because they involve disputed factual issues
on which expert pathologists could shed light.
C. "SYNDROME" EVIDENCE
Courts have begun to admit evidence that the defendant is or
has been subject to a special set of pressures and injuries that may
explain that person's actions. These pressures and injuries and the
actions of the defendant that result have been grouped under the
255 See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 239, at 757-88.
256 In addition to the effect intoxication can have in a self-defense case, intoxication
can serve as a complete defense to certain crimes. LAFAVE, supra note 244, at 439-54;
DRESSLER, supra note 244, at 275-88.
257 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 239, at 731-47.
258 Id. at 719.
259 Id. at 719-25.
260 Id. at 724.
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term "syndrome." 26 1 For example, a woman who endures continu-
ous cycles of physical, emotional or sexual abuse at the hands of a
spouse or partner over a long period of time is said to experience
battered woman's syndrome. 262 In a typical case, the woman kills
her abuser while he is not actively engaged in abuse; as a result, the
immediate threat to the defendant required by the law of self de-
fense 2 6 3 cannot be proven under traditional conceptions of the
term.264 Defense counsel, assisted by an expert, could offer evi-
dence of battered woman's syndrome to show that the threat was
indeed immediate, given the context of fear and abuse within which
the battered woman lives. In sum, "syndrome" evidence 26 5 can
demonstrate that circumstances beyond the pale of everyday exper-
iences justify excusing the conduct of a defendant when traditional
jurisprudence or notions about the world would hold otherwise.
Persuasive evidence of behavioral syndromes requires the help
of an expert. The expert, usually a psychiatrist or psychologist, ex-
plains the syndrome, helping the jury to understand the complex of
behaviors and symptoms and the reasons battered women do not
behave as others might expect (e.g., "Why didn't she just
leave?"). 266 Since it is possible to make a traditional (even if likely
261 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS app. C, at 405 (3d ed. rev. 1987) ("A group of symptoms that occur
together, and that constitute a recognizable condition. 'Syndrome' is less specific than
'disorder' or 'disease.' "); see also J. E. SCHMIDT, M.D., 3 ATrORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE S-309 (1991) (defines "syndrome" as "[a] number of symptoms and signs
which occur together as a group and usually indicate a particular disease or diseased
condition.").
262 DRESSLER, supra note 244, at 203-04 & n.8; MARTIN BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE
EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW § 7.4(K) (Supp. 1989).
263 E.g., State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 567, 569-70 (Kan. 1986); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.04(1) (1985).
264 E.g., Rocco C. Cipparone, Jr., Comment, The Defense of Battered Women Who Kill, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 427, 436-37 (1987) ("In particular, the current formulation of the immi-
nence requirement will, in many situations, impede the success of self-defense claims
asserted by women who have killed their batterers."); see also State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364, 377-78 (NJ. 1984); CathrynJo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical
Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 13 (1986) (cases in
which defendants have been victims of battered woman's syndrome are difficult because
"'they do not fit neatly" into criminal law's categories); Walter W. Steele & Christine W.
Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine of Self-Defense to Accomodate Battered Women, 18 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 169 (1991).
265 Another example of a behavioral syndrome used in court is battered child syn-
drome. Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 997 (Wyo. 1984) (defendant accused of killing
father after years of abuse, also affecting mother and sister, properly prevented from
introducing expert psychiatric evidence of "battered child syndrome"; to allow justifica-
tion of homicide on such "subjective" evidence "would amount to a leap into the abyss
of anarchy"); Mark Hansen, Battered Child's Defense, 78 A.B.A.J. 28 (May 1992) (surveying
recent cases of children tried for killing abusive parents).
266 See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN 19-31 (1979). Nevertheless, many
518 [Vol. 83
1992] THE CONSTITUTION AND TRUTH SEEKING
unsuccessful) self-defense argument without an expert, however, a
court using the basic tools theory would be unlikely to grant a re-
quest for expert services. After all, such a court would reason, the
defendant need not have an expert to make a case; she can attempt
to explain her actions through her own testimony or the testimony
of other fact witnesses. By contrast, a court applying the truth seek-
ing theory would grant a request for such an expert. The issue is
clearly in dispute, and the expert can produce helpful evidence that
the factfinder should consider.
D. SEX OFFENSES
The trial of sex offenses often requires the use of scientific evi-
dence, some of it highly specialized. Most sex offense cases center
around consent, fabrication or the identity of the assailant. Which-
ever of these issues predominates in any particular case, medical
and scientific evidence may support or undermine the prosecution's
allegations in important ways. 267
When a victim reports a sexual assault, written reports are usu-
ally made by both the police and by medical personnel. The medi-
cal report will contain information about the victim's subjective
symptoms, behavior, observable trauma and conclusions about the
likely cause(s) of the situation.268 Such evidence might generate
questions about both consent 269 and fabrication that only a forensic
expert can properly answer. 270
On the issue of the identity of the assailant, scientific evidence
becomes critical. DNA testing has quickly become the method of
courts have resisted efforts to introduce expert testimony on these subjects, leaving de-
fendants in these cases to make their self-defense arguments against the backdrop of
traditional self-defense doctrine, which ill fits the facts in their cases. Courts give two
broad reasons for excluding expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome. First, the
testimony of an expert must be helpful to the jury in understanding a subject beyond the
ken of most lay people. Second, largely because the concept itself is relatively new,
courts sometimes say that battered woman's syndrome does not represent a generally
accepted theory in a recognized and reliable field of science. DRESSLER, supra note 244,
at 204.
267 CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 33.1, 33.9.
268 Id. at 33.10.
269 Some states still require resistance from the victim to show lack of consent. This
position is the minority rule, and well it should be. Resistance can be dangerous; resist-
ance increases both the frequency of victim injury and its seriousness. BATELLE MEMO-
RIAL INSTITUTE LAW AND JUSTICE STUDY CENTER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE:
AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 1-14 (1978). As others have persuasively argued, a wo-
man should not have to put herself at physical risk to avoid nonconsensual sex. See
SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 22 (1986).
270 For example, given the victim's story, the lack of medical evidence an observer
would expect to see might undermine the story's credibility.
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choice for identifying attackers in sexual assaults. 271 Even so, iden-
tification through DNA testing deserves careful scrutiny.272 When
the state does not use DNA testing to establish identity, it often uses
identification by blood typing.273 By testing a suspect's own body
fluids, police are able to tell whether a sample taken from the victim
or crime scene is consistent with the fluids of the suspect.274 Thus, a
person can be ruled out of, or ruled into, the potential pool of
suspects.
The types of evidence discussed here do not exhaust the poten-
tial categories of scientific evidence in sexual assault cases. 275 They
do, however, illustrate the fact that scientific and medical evidence
plays an important role in sexual assault cases, without being out-
come-determinative. Blood typing, for example, is an almost proto-
typical type of highly relevant but nondeterminative evidence. It
cannot make or break the case by itself, but it can provide a power-
ful link in the chain of evidence in a typical case. Similarly, evidence
of injuries and trauma may support or conflict with the facts the vic-
tim relates. All of this evidence shares one characteristic: It proves
difficult and sometimes impossible to mount arguments and de-
fenses on these points without expert services on which to rely for
the "evaluation, preparation, and presentation"2 76 of evidence. De-
spite the significance of scientific evidence in such cases, the basic
tools approach would be unlikely to fund expert services for the ex-
ploration of these issues, because they will not usually be disposi-
tive. The truth seeking theory, on the other hand, would provide
expert services in these cases because the expert's testimony would
enhance the factfinder's understanding of the evidence relevant to
disputed issues.
271 See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text. See also Commonwealth v. Brison,
52 Crim. L. Rep. 1273 (BNA) (Jan. 6, 1993) (in sexual assault case centering on identifi-
cation, prosecution must perform and pay for DNA testing for indigent defendant).
272 Id.; Giannelli,supra note 236, at 796-97 & n.34 (detailing erroneous DNA testing
results).
273 In the most simplistic terms, it is first determined if the persons involved are
secretors. Secretors are persons whose bodily fluids-saliva or semen, for example-
carry "markers" that identify their blood types. If forensic personnel find body fluids on
the victim, her clothing or surroundings, they can be examined for "markers" of blood
type.
274 1 have paraphrased this succinct description of identification by blood typing from
CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 33.11. For a more thorough explanation,
see GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 239, at 565-632; JoN ZONDERMAN, BEYOND THE
CRIME LAB-THE NEW SCIENCE OF INVESTIGATION 91-93 (1990).
275 See, e.g., CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 33.12-14 (issues regarding
sperm, semen, hair and fibers); GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 239, at 304-08;
RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS 337 (4th ed. 1990).
276 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
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E. POLICE "EXPERTS"
Increasingly, the prosecution makes use of police officers as ex-
pert witnesses on criminal activities. 277 For example, in drug cases,
the prosecution typically proffers police officers as experts in meth-
ods of drug use, packaging and sales.
27 8
Police testimony can have a great impact on a jury's conclu-
sions. The police are the only ones who can give regular citizens
insight into the world of crime. Their testimony becomes all the
more weighty when the court and the prosecution label'it expert
opinion.279 The defense must proffer its own expert testimony in
order to be able to challenge the prosecution's interpretation of the
defendant's conduct. 2 0 Since such testimony by itself would not be
outcome-determinative, however, a court operating under the basic
tools standard would not fund it. Under the truth seeking theory,
however, a court would provide funding for expert services when
the defendant contests a relevant and important issue testified about
by police experts.
V. IMPLEMENTATION CONCERNS
The truth seeking theory represents an improvement over the
basic tools approach because it provides indigent defendants with
funding for expert services on the basis of the utility of the service to
277 I do not mean officers (or even civilians who work for law enforcement agencies)
who are employed and trained specifically to do scientific testing, such as police lab
toxicologists or field evidence technicians. Rather, I have in mind an officer involved in
law enforcement activity on the street, offered by the prosecution as an expert in an
aspect of some criminal activity. See, e.g., People v. Clay, 38 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1964) (of-
ficer offered as an expert on "till tapping"); CRIMINAL PRACTICE INsTrruTE, supra note 7,
at 33.25; Deon J. Nossel, The Admissibility of Ultimate Issue Expert Testimony by Law Enforce-
ment Officers in Criminal Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (1992) (prosecutors increasingly
use law enforcement officers as experts, especially in narcotics cases).
278 For instance, in a case in which the defendant is arrested with money but without
any drugs in his possession, a drug expert may testify that the area is "a high drug
trafficking area" and that drug dealers hide their products in "stashes." The prosecu-
tion would urge the jury to draw the inference from this testimony that the defendant
was, in fact, selling drugs, despite the fact that there may be other explanations for the
conduct of the defendant consistent with innocence. CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTrrTE,
supra note 7, at 33.25-26.
279 See, e.g., James R. Acker & Hans Toch, Battered Women, Straw Men, and Expert Testi-
mony, 21 CRIM. L. BuLL. 125, 146 n.53 (1985) (use of expert imbues testimony "with the
,aura of infallibility.' ").
280 A problem suggests itself: Given the well-known "code of silence" among police
officers, what police officer would serve as a defense expert? Former officers are one
solution. Retired police officers sometimes serve as investigators for public defense
agencies. See, e.g., Bliss, supra note 7, at 264 (experienced police investigator explains his
role as one of the first investigators in any public defender's office).
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the factfinding process. 281 The greater access to expert services
provided by the truth seeking theory does, however, raise questions
concerning implementation. For example, what prevents defense
counsel from requesting expert services to explore every conceiva-
ble issue in a case? Further, what would implementing the theory
cost? I will begin to address these questions by discussing the basis
upon which a defendant could make a request for expert services. I
will then focus on the mechanics of making the request. Finally, I
will consider the cost to society resulting from implementation of
the truth seeking theory.
A. BASIS FOR THE REQUEST
Not every case will supply defense counsel with the information
necessary to make a request for expert services simply on the basis
of the charging papers and information received through discovery.
In many cases, it may be necessary to consult preliminarily with an
expert or investigator just to see whether an issue worth pursuing
exists before asking the court for full expert funding.
The federal Criminal Justice Act 282 supplies funding for just
such a procedure. The Act provides for a small amount of "seed
money" that can be obtained without a request to the court for the
purpose of investigating whether the preliminarily available facts
present an issue worth investigating. 283 The availability of these
funds would serve as an initial screening device; if a preliminary in-
quiry turned up nothing, counsel would be less likely to make a re-
quest for expert services, and less able to support such a request if
281 There are some types of experts for whom the truth seeking theory would not
provide funding. For example, requests for jury selection experts-who assist trial at-
torneys by constructing profiles of ideal jurors-should not receive funding under the
truth seeking theory. The assistance they provide would have no relevance to any issue
of fact. Similarly, statisticians who assist attorneys in challenging the composition of the
pool of available jurors would not be funded. While quite important-in fact, re-
quired-to mount challenges, based on jury composition, these experts would provide
no evidence directly relevant to the facts of the case. The point I wish to make is that
while the truth seeking theory will undoubtedly provide funds for many more experts
than the basic tools approach does, it is not an ever-expanding invitation to expend
resources. Rather, it is a reasonably narrow approach focused on the heart of a complex
problem-the effect of poverty on factual determinations in criminal trials.
282 See supra note 133.
283 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(2) (1988) allows appointed defense counsel to obtain "in-
vestigative, expert, and other services without prior authorization if necessary for ade-
quate representation." Counsel's actions are "subject to later review" by the court; total
cost may not exceed three hundred dollars and "expenses reasonably incurred." Id. The
court may approve additional expenditures without prior requests "in the interest of
justice, and upon the finding that timely procurement of necessary services could not
await prior authorization."Id.
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28 4
B. THRESHOLD APPLICABILITY: THE MECHANICS OF THE REQUEST
At what point in the proceedings and under what circumstances
should the defense request expert services? The answer involves
timing and discovery procedure.
Under the truth seeking theory, defense counsel should make
requests for expert services after the filing of initial charging papers,
any formal indictment, the completion of the state's discovery obli-
gations (including the constitutionally required disclosure of excul-
patory evidence), and the state's answers to any bills of particulars.
Armed with this information, defense counsel would be in a position
to understand the basic thrust of the state's case, to identify dis-
puted issues, and to determine which expert services would produce
evidence relevant to the factfinder's decision. This procedure
would prevent interpretations of the truth seeking theory that would
impose unreasonably burdensome duties of factual production on
the defense, as has happened under the basic tools theory. 28 5
Rather than proving a prima facie case before an expert can evaluate
and develop the evidence, as Ake requires, a defendant under the
truth seeking theory need only make a showing based on the evidence
available that the services of an expert could contribute to the
factfinder's resolution of a disputed issue of fact.
As Ake suggests, 286 motions for expert services should be made
ex parte.287 Requests for expert services could reveal the theory the
defense plans to use at trial, and perhaps even information gathered
through client confidences. Exercise of the right to expert services
should not require the defense to disclose theory, work product or
confidences to the prosecution. Since the request for expert serv-
ices will follow prosecution disclosure of information to the defense,
usually through discovery, rules of procedure should require that
discovery come early in the process,288 or simply allow requests for
284 I am not the first to recommend the use of a procedure akin to the Act's seed
money provisions. See West, supra note 19, at 1361 & n.217.
285 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
286 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985).
287 West, supra note 19, at 1361-62.
288 Some discovery rules do require disclosure early in the process. E.g., MD. R. PROC.
4-263(e) (mandatory disclosure to be made "within 25 days after the earlier of the ap-
pearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant."; defense request for dis-
closure of other information "shall be made within 15 days after the earlier of the
appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court."); OHIo
CRIM. R. 16(F) ("A defendant shall make his motion for discovery within twenty-one
days after arraignment or seven days before the date of trial, whichever is earlier, or at
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expert services to follow completion of discovery. When granting a
request for expert services would entail some delay in the proceed-
ings, judges should be willing to favorably entertain motions for
continuances and bail reductions.
C. THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING THE TRUTH SEEKING THEORY
One criticism of the theory proposed here is that it will cost
more than the basic tools approach. This is almost certainly correct,
since courts using the theory will grant many requests for expert
services currently denied. Supporters of the basic tools approach
value the fact that it takes cost into account;28 9 it balances the po-
tential benefits of the expert service against the damage to the pub-
lic fisc that granting the request would do.
The simplest response to this argument is that the truth seeking
theory will not result in uncontrolled costs. First, the screening
function that the theory's two basic questions will perform,290 the
procedural recommendations outlined above 291 and counsel's obli-
gation to make only those arguments for which there is a good faith
or reasonable basis29 2 will limit the number of requests. Second,
some jurisdictions are supplying some expert services already; 293 it
is only additional expenditures over and above the amount currently
spent that represent an increase. Perhaps most important, a purely
economic approach disregards the social costs of using Ake's basic
tools approach. The government's interest in criminal adjudication
is not simply to convict the accused. Rather, it is to convict the ac-
cused only if it is possible to do so while doing justice. 294 Viewing
the criminal justice system from this perspective, balancing the need
for the resources necessary to give the factfinder all the evidence
necessary to decide the case against the expense of doing so seems
inappropriate. After all, it is the state that has initiated the prosecu-
tion in an effort to convict the defendant, to mark him permanently
as a transgressor, and perhaps to take away his freedom. It is in-
cumbent on the state to do this in a way that allows for a fair deci-
such reasonable time later as the court may permit."). Other rules do not prescribe the
time for discovery. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
289 See, e.g., Willis, supra note 19, at 1029-31 (cost of expert services for indigent de-
fendants must be considered and might outweigh benefits).
290 See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
292 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4, DR 7-102(A)(2) (1981);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983).
293 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
294 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981); DRESSLER, supra note 143, at 21.
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sion based on all the available evidence-not just the evidence that
an impoverished defendant can afford.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1956, the Supreme Court has tried, with uneven results,
to deal with the problem of the impact of wealth on the criminal
justice system. Surely,Justice Black's sentiment- that the quality of
justice should not depend on the defendant's wealth or poverty295 -
is among the most noble to appear in the opinion of any court. Yet
its transformation into doctrine proved troublesome; the equality
principle seemed to promise almost a reinvention of our society.
The eventual replacement of the equality principle by the basic tools
approach seemed less problematic from the point of view of doc-
trine, but it did not do enough to address the problem that took the
Supreme Court down this path in the first place-the effect poverty
has on the outcomes of criminal cases and on justice as a whole.
Indeed, reviewing Ake and the cases that have followed it brings
Clarence Darrow's words back to mind. Is justice still, first and
last-indeed, will it always be-a question of money?
The truth seeking theory addresses this problem not by seeking
to make defendants more equal in some undefined (and perhaps un-
definable) way, or by asking what tools are so basic that justice abso-
lutely requires them. Instead, the theory gives content to the
constitutional guarantees designed to support the search for the
truth. By improving the ability of the factfinder to accurately deter-
mine the truth, the truth seeking theory helps ensure that indigent
defendants have a trial unaffected by poverty.
295 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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